A Historic Geopolitical Shift
The Horn of Africa is undergoing a significant geopolitical transformation. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland in January 2024 has the potential to redefine regional dynamics, altering economic dependencies and shifting strategic power balances. For Ethiopia, a nation landlocked since Eritrea’s independence in 1993, the agreement represents more than just a trade deal—it is a critical step towards economic autonomy and regional dominance.
However, this agreement has met stiff resistance from Somalia, which claims Somaliland as part of its territory, despite having little to no administrative control over the region for more than three decades. The question for Ethiopia is clear: will it seize this moment to secure its long-term strategic interests, or will it succumb to external diplomatic and political pressures?
Ethiopia’s Maritime Ambitions and Strategic Necessity
Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation and one of its fastest-growing economies, has long been constrained by its landlocked status. Over 95 per cent of its imports and exports pass through Djibouti, making it overly reliant on a single access point to global markets. This dependence exposes Ethiopia to fluctuating tariffs, political instability, and infrastructure limitations in Djibouti.
By securing a 20-kilometre stretch of Somaliland’s coastline and developing an exclusive port and naval base, Ethiopia is making a bid for economic sovereignty. Gaining direct access to the sea will enable Ethiopia to diversify its trade routes, reducing its reliance on Djibouti and ensuring more resilient supply chains. A maritime outlet through Somaliland will lower logistical costs, enhancing the competitiveness of Ethiopian businesses and facilitating greater export capacity.
This deal also carries a major geopolitical advantage. With a presence on Somaliland’s coast, Ethiopia strengthens its influence in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, both critical international shipping lanes. The establishment of a naval base will further allow Ethiopia to project power in the region, safeguarding its trade interests and contributing to broader security efforts in the Horn of Africa.
Somaliland: Ethiopia’s Ideal Maritime Partner
Unlike Somalia, which continues to grapple with terrorism, political instability, and weak governance, Somaliland has been a beacon of stability since it unilaterally declared independence in 1991. While the international community has been slow to recognise Somaliland’s sovereignty, its internal governance structures have remained resilient, fostering a functioning democracy and strong institutions.
Somaliland’s ability to maintain security within its territory for over three decades makes it an ideal partner for Ethiopia’s maritime ambitions. Unlike Somalia, where the government in Mogadishu struggles to exercise control even over its capital city, Somaliland has successfully managed its own affairs, ensuring peace and stability. Its geographical position on the Gulf of Aden places it in a highly strategic location, far more critical than Somalia’s Indian Ocean coastline.
Ethiopia’s engagement with Somaliland is therefore grounded in realpolitik. Somaliland has demonstrated its reliability as a trade and security partner, and Ethiopia’s willingness to invest in this relationship is a pragmatic decision based on mutual benefit rather than ideology.
Somalia’s Opposition: Symbolism Over Substance?
Somalia’s fierce opposition to the MoU is rooted in its insistence on preserving territorial integrity based on colonial-era borders. However, Somalia has not exercised real authority over Somaliland since the early 1990s, nor has it managed to stabilise its governance in Mogadishu. Despite its strong rhetoric, Somalia’s government lacks the military, economic, and political leverage to enforce its claims over Somaliland.
The Somali government’s reaction appears to be more symbolic than substantive. It is driven by a desire to maintain international recognition of its territorial claims rather than any practical ability to govern Somaliland. Moreover, external actors such as Turkey, which has significant strategic and economic interests in Somalia, have amplified Somalia’s opposition.
The reality remains that Somaliland has functioned independently for decades, and Ethiopia’s deal with Hargeisa is a reflection of this practical sovereignty. Whether Somalia acknowledges it or not, Somaliland’s stability and self-governance make it a more viable partner for Ethiopia than the fragile administration in Mogadishu.
Risks and Missed Opportunities: The Cost of Ethiopia’s Retraction
If Ethiopia were to withdraw from the MoU due to external pressures, it would risk missing a historic opportunity with significant economic and strategic consequences. Remaining dependent on Djibouti’s ports would perpetuate Ethiopia’s logistical vulnerabilities, keeping its economy subject to external tariff fluctuations and limiting its trade flexibility.
Geopolitically, backing away from the deal would weaken Ethiopia’s standing in the region. It would embolden rivals such as Egypt, which has historically sought to counter Ethiopian influence in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, it would allow other external actors, including Turkey and Qatar, to shape the regional order in ways that may not align with Ethiopia’s long-term interests.
Security risks would also emerge if Ethiopia abandoned its partnership with Somaliland. Without Ethiopian engagement, the potential for a security vacuum in Somaliland could increase, creating an environment where extremist groups and foreign military interventions could gain a foothold. Moreover, Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the deal would damage its credibility as a strategic player, reducing its leverage in future regional negotiations.
External Powers: The Influence of Turkey and Other Players
One of the most complex dimensions of this geopolitical equation is the role of external actors. Turkey, a key ally of Somalia, has positioned itself as a mediator in the dispute, but its vested interests make impartiality difficult. Turkey’s influence in Somalia is extensive, ranging from military training programmes for Somali forces to major infrastructure investments in Mogadishu. Given its close ties to Somalia, Turkey’s ability to serve as an objective arbitrator in the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement is questionable.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is another major player with a vested interest in the region. The UAE’s DP World has invested heavily in the development of Berbera Port, aligning with Ethiopia’s strategic objectives. Additionally, China’s growing presence in Djibouti through its military base and infrastructure projects further complicates the geopolitical landscape.
The increasing involvement of global powers in the Horn of Africa underscores the region’s growing strategic importance. For Ethiopia, this means that securing its maritime interests through Somaliland must be a priority before foreign actors dictate its economic and security future.
Ethiopia’s Path Forward
The Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU represents a transformative opportunity for Ethiopia to rewrite its economic and geopolitical narrative. By securing access to Somaliland’s coast, Ethiopia can reduce its dependency on Djibouti, lower logistical costs, and cement its position as a dominant force in the Horn of Africa.
Despite Somalia’s opposition and international diplomatic hurdles, Ethiopia must recognise the long-term strategic value of this agreement. A retreat from this MoU would not only undermine its economic sovereignty but also embolden regional adversaries and weaken its influence over critical maritime trade routes.
Ethiopia stands at a pivotal juncture. The decision it makes today will shape its economic and strategic landscape for decades to come. Whether it boldly moves forward or hesitates in the face of external pressures will determine its trajectory as a regional powerhouse in the 21st century.
