Somalia’s government has escalated a diplomatic standoff by banning Taiwanese passport holders, reacting strongly against Taiwan’s outreach to the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Citing violations of its sovereignty, Mogadishu insists that any foreign dealings with Somaliland bypassing Somalia are illegal. The move comes amid internal strains in Somaliland – from the breakaway region’s eastern conflict to fresh discontent in its western Awdal region – and highlights a complex triangle involving Taiwan’s search for partners in Africa and China’s backing of Somalia’s stance. This article analyses these developments in context, including Somalia’s historical position on territorial integrity since 1991, Taiwan’s unique diplomatic strategy on the continent, and the implications for regional stability, China’s influence, and international recognition in the Horn of Africa.
Map of Somaliland’s regions. Awdal region (dark green, west) is experiencing discontent with Hargeisa’s rule, while the Sool region (pink, east) is under control of pro-Somalia SSC-Khaatumo forces
Somalia Draws the Line: Banning Taiwanese Passports
In late April 2025, Somalia’s federal government took the unprecedented step of barring entry to anyone holding a Taiwanese passport. The Somali Civil Aviation Authority issued a notice to airlines effective April 30, instructing them not to accept Taiwan-issued travel documents for entry or transit. Officials in Mogadishu justified the ban by invoking the United Nations “one China” resolution of 1971, which recognized Beijing as the representative of China at the U.N. Somalia, aligning with Beijing’s stance that Taiwan is a breakaway province of China, stated it was simply upholding this principle. Somalia’s then-Foreign Minister (now Defence Minister) Ahmed Moallim Fiqi underscored that any “illegal” Taiwanese activities on Somali soil would not be tolerated. The government in Mogadishu stressed that Taiwan’s presence in Somaliland – a region it deems an integral part of Somalia – violated the independence and unity of Somalia by operating there without Somalia’s permission.
Somalia’s decision was triggered by a specific provocation. In mid-April, Taiwan’s Foreign Minister and other senior officials had planned an unapproved visit to Somaliland – without notifying Mogadishu. For Somalia’s leadership, this was a red line. The federal government viewed any such bilateral dealings with Somaliland as an infringement on Somalia’s territorial integrity. By banning Taiwanese passport holders, Somalia signaled that it would not allow what it sees as encroachment on its authority over Somaliland. Somalia accused Taiwan of encouraging separatism and labelled it a political and security threat for supporting the fragmentation of the Somali nation.
Taiwan swiftly condemned Somalia’s move as politically motivated and instigated by China. Taipei’s foreign ministry lodged a formal protest and demanded Somalia immediately revoke the ban. It criticized Mogadishu for misinterpreting the U.N. resolution to pretend Taiwan belonged to the PRC. In a reciprocal gesture, Taiwan reportedly barred Somali passport holders from entering the island, although this tit-for-tat was overshadowed by the larger sovereignty dispute. Somaliland’s authorities rejected Somalia’s right to speak for them: Somaliland’s foreign ministry insisted that Somaliland governs its own territory and borders, so Mogadishu’s ban was moot in Somaliland and merely a political show. Practically, travelers can still enter Somaliland on Taiwanese passports via direct flights, since Somaliland controls its airports – highlighting the on-the-ground reality that Somalia’s edicts carry little weight in Hargeisa.
China praised Somalia’s stance. The Chinese Foreign Ministry applauded the entry ban as a “legitimate measure” to safeguard Somalia’s rights, saying it highly commends Somalia’s commitment to the one-China principle. Beijing portrayed Somalia’s move as firm resistance to any form of official Taiwan-Somaliland ties. This alignment with Beijing’s policy earned Somalia public approval from China – a strategic win for Mogadishu as it seeks international backing against Somaliland’s independence drive. Somali officials, however, downplayed direct Chinese pressure. Still, the convergence of Somalia’s and China’s interests is clear: both oppose any recognition of territories they deem breakaway provinces (Somaliland and Taiwan respectively). Somalia’s hardline reaction thus dovetails neatly with China’s geopolitical campaign to isolate Taiwan.
Taiwan’s Outreach in Africa and the Somaliland Gamble
Taiwan’s engagement with Somaliland did not emerge in a vacuum. In 2020, Taiwan and Somaliland struck a remarkable partnership by opening reciprocal representative offices in each other’s capitals. For Taiwan, which has been diplomatically frozen out of most of Africa, this was a rare foothold. Currently Eswatini is the only African country that officially recognizes Taiwan – all others recognize Beijing. Somaliland, in turn, saw Taiwan as a willing partner that offered development aid and investment without the baggage of formal recognition. Both territories share a peculiar bond: each is a self-governing democracy lacking widespread international recognition. By forging ties, Somaliland and Taiwan each gained a measure of validation on the world stage, albeit angering the central governments in Mogadishu and Beijing.
Taipei’s approach to Somaliland is part of its broader diplomatic strategy in Africa, which has been largely informal outreach and pragmatic cooperation. Over the past few decades, Taiwan’s official allies in Africa dwindled as China won recognition from states like Burkina Faso and São Tomé. Rather than compete head-on with Beijing’s clout, Taiwan has pursued de facto relationships – through trade offices, development projects, and humanitarian aid – even in countries that don’t recognize it. In Somaliland, Taiwan found a ready friend: an entity that itself longs for recognition and is willing to defy the norms of the African Union. In exchange, Somaliland receives Taiwan’s technical and economic assistance. Since 2020, cooperation has grown – from healthcare and education projects to plans for technology and energy initiatives. In February 2025, Taipei even appointed a new envoy to Hargeisa, signaling that ties were warming further. It was against this backdrop that Taiwan’s foreign minister planned to visit Somaliland, presumably to solidify partnerships and perhaps sign new agreements.
From Taiwan’s perspective, engaging Somaliland is not meant to provoke war, but rather to expand its international presence and support another democracy. Nevertheless, the move is bold: Taiwan is effectively recognizing (at least implicitly) a government that no U.N. member formally recognizes as a sovereign state. This gives Somaliland a pseudo-recognition by a fellow outsider. Indeed, Taiwan’s dealings with Somaliland have been described by Somali officials as an attempt to create two breakaway regions supporting each other – a characterisation that turns the diplomatic venture into a threat in the eyes of those governments fighting secession at home.
Somalia’s leaders allege that Taiwan’s involvement goes beyond mere diplomacy. Mogadishu accuses Taiwan of bolstering Somaliland’s security forces, even claiming that Taiwanese-trained Somaliland troops fought against pro-unity militias in Somaliland’s recent conflicts. While Taipei has not confirmed any military cooperation, such claims show the depth of mistrust. If true, Taiwan’s support to Somaliland’s forces (perhaps in police or coast guard training programs) would indeed cross from diplomacy into security affairs, further enraging Somalia. Even rumours of a Taiwan–Somaliland military cooperation agreement have circulated, raising eyebrows in Beijing and Mogadishu alike.
For Somaliland, Taiwan’s friendship is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it brings investment and a semblance of diplomatic recognition – a morale boost for a nation that declared independence in 1991 and has since been yearning for international acceptance. On the other hand, it risks provoking powerful adversaries. Somaliland’s government, led by President Muse Bihi Abdi, has staunchly defended its right to engage with Taiwan, asserting that it will not be dictated to by Mogadishu. But by doing so, Hargeisa finds itself at odds not only with Somalia but also with China – a heavyweight that could influence how other countries and organizations treat Somaliland. Despite these risks, Somaliland appears determined to maintain the Taiwan relationship. The Taiwan liaison office remains open in Hargeisa, and Somaliland even opened its own representative office in Taipei. In a sense, Somaliland and Taiwan see reflections of each other – both are democratic, have their own currencies, militaries, and elections, yet are kept out of most global forums. This empathy fuels their cooperation, even as it antagonizes those who view their partnership as an alliance of separatists.
Brewing Trouble in Somaliland’s Backyard: Awdal’s Discontent and Internal Strife
Even as Somaliland’s government asserts its external friendships, it is grappling with serious internal challenges to its authority. For decades, Somaliland prided itself on being a haven of stability in contrast to war-torn southern Somalia. It built its own institutions and held multiple elections. However, the unity within Somaliland’s borders has started to fray. Over the past year, internal tensions have escalated on two fronts – the east and the west – posing an existential test to the breakaway republic’s cohesion.
In the east, Somaliland has effectively lost control of large parts of Sool region after a violent uprising. In February 2023, fighting erupted in the city of Las Anod between Somaliland forces and local Dhulbahante clan militias who reject Somaliland’s rule. After months of heavy conflict, the Somaliland Army was driven out of Las Anod by August 2023. The victorious militias revived a long-dormant entity called SSC-Khaatumo and declared their intention to reunite with Somalia. Sool and parts of the neighbouring Sanaag region have since been administered by this self-proclaimed Khaatumo State, in open defiance of Hargeisa. In a dramatic turn, Somalia’s federal parliament in Mogadishu moved to formally recognise SSC-Khaatumo as a new federal member state in April 2024. This recognition by Somalia (though not acknowledged internationally) effectively split Somaliland’s territory: overnight, the would-be independent Somaliland saw around half of its claimed land and population assert loyalty to Somalia.
Now a new fissure threatens Somaliland from the west. In the Awdal region bordering Djibouti (Somaliland’s north-western corner), long-simmering grievances have erupted into open defiance of the Hargeisa authorities. Awdal is predominantly home to the Gadabursi clan, some of whom have felt marginalised under Somaliland’s predominantly Isaaq-led administration. Frustrations in Awdal have been heightened by delayed elections and perceptions of unequal development. The recent flashpoint, however, was a deal struck behind closed doors: in late 2023, Somaliland’s government signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia – reportedly offering Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s ports or resources, possibly in exchange for future recognition of Somaliland’s statehood. When news of this MoU reached Awdal, local leaders were incensed. They saw it as Hargeisa bargaining away “their” land or coastline without consultation. In March 2024, community elders in the coastal district of Lughaya, Awdal, held an extraordinary meeting on the beach and publicly repudiated the Somaliland-Ethiopia MoU. These elders made a stunning declaration: they no longer recognise the Somaliland government and instead pledge allegiance to the Federal Government of Somalia.
This was not merely rhetoric – it marked a decisive break from Somaliland’s separatist ambitions in the eyes of a key constituency within its territory. The Awdal dissent has given rise to an embryonic separatist (or rather unionist) movement sometimes dubbed the “Awdal State” or “Jamahirta Awdal”. Its proponents seek either greater autonomy within Somaliland or outright reunification with Somalia. They have even courted external support: Awdal political figures and diaspora have engaged with Ethiopia and Somalia to put pressure on Hargeisa. By early 2025, the situation grew tense enough that Somaliland’s authorities moved quietly to placate Awdal – even the influential opposition leader Abdirahman Irro (himself from Awdal) visited the regional capital Borama to urge calm and unity. Nonetheless, the drumbeats of a potential internal conflict in Awdal are growing louder. Armed militias linked to Awdal dissenters have reportedly begun organising. In one alarming incident in mid-2023, Somaliland security forces clashed with a clan militia that was said to have backing from opposition figures in Awdal, leaving several police officers dead. Somaliland’s Interior Minister accused opposition leaders of instigating the violence, reflecting Hargeisa’s fear that political rivalry could morph into a tribal rebellion.
If Somaliland ends up fighting an insurgency in Awdal on top of the revolt in the east, its forces would be stretched to breaking point. Such a two-front conflict could even threaten the very existence of the Somaliland entity. This internal fragility ironically strengthens Somalia’s hand. Every clan or region that peels away from Somaliland is a validation of Mogadishu’s stance that Somaliland’s independence project is untenable. Indeed, Somali nationalists point to the Awdal elders’ pledge of loyalty as proof that many in Somaliland want to be part of the Somali nation, not a secessionist entity. Within Somalia’s south-central federation, politicians have celebrated these rifts; some former officials argue that Taiwan’s outreach only emboldened Somaliland’s separatist leaders, prolonging the conflict. Others counter that Somaliland’s internal divisions are of its own making – a result of governance issues and clan inequities – and that external players like Taiwan are convenient scapegoats for Hargeisa’s troubles.
Geopolitical Ripples: Regional Stability, China’s Role, and the Question of Recognition
The dispute involving Somalia, Taiwan, and Somaliland reflects far more than a tripartite clash—it is a prism through which larger questions of sovereignty, global diplomacy, and shifting influence in Africa can be examined. The Horn of Africa has long been a geostrategic chessboard, and the recent developments add new layers to its complexity.
At the heart of the issue lies a dual contest for recognition. Taiwan seeks international space amid growing Chinese pressure to diplomatically isolate it. Somaliland, for its part, has pursued international recognition since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, yet continues to be treated as a domestic matter by the global community. When these two quests intersected in 2020 with the establishment of mutual representative offices, it marked a convergence of two ‘unrecognised but functional’ polities—a symbolic, if not legal, recognition of mutual legitimacy.
For Somalia, however, this convergence was unacceptable. Mogadishu, which has historically defended the inviolability of its colonial-era borders—just as the African Union’s Constitutive Act demands—views any foreign recognition of Somaliland as a direct threat to national unity. This sentiment is not rhetorical. The Somali constitution explicitly states that the Federal Republic includes all regions, including Somaliland. Any attempt to legitimise Hargeisa’s independent diplomacy is thus considered both illegal and subversive.
What complicates matters further is the involvement of external powers, particularly China. Beijing views any international dealings with Taiwan as a violation of the “One China” principle. Somalia’s recent ban on Taiwanese passports, its diplomatic denunciations of Taiwan’s overtures in Somaliland, and its rhetorical solidarity with Beijing have all been well received by the Chinese government. In return, Somalia is likely to receive increased economic and diplomatic support, including infrastructure investment, technical assistance, and potentially even favourable terms on bilateral agreements. In essence, Mogadishu has chosen a predictable strategic ally in China, whose position on territorial integrity aligns neatly with Somalia’s own claims over Somaliland.
The alignment also reinforces Beijing’s broader objectives in Africa. China is now the largest bilateral lender and one of the most influential external actors on the continent. From railway projects in Kenya to ports in Djibouti and military installations in the Red Sea corridor, Chinese presence is deeply entrenched. Ensuring that no African territory openly aligns with Taiwan is a key pillar of Beijing’s Africa policy. The Somalia-Somaliland-Taiwan triangle has, therefore, become a symbolic battleground in this wider contest. Beijing will want to ensure that Taiwan’s experiment with Somaliland remains isolated and does not encourage other African territories—or secessionist movements—toward similar bilateral ties.
For the United States and its allies, the developments pose a different sort of dilemma. On one hand, the U.S. has never recognised Somaliland and officially supports the territorial integrity of Somalia. On the other, Washington has strong informal relations with Taiwan, supports its democratic governance, and views China’s encroaching influence in Africa with increasing concern. The Somalia-Taiwan passport ban, seen by some American policymakers as inspired by Beijing, has sparked reactions in Washington, particularly among legislators who fear that Somalia is becoming overly compliant with China’s geopolitical designs. Some have even called for a re-evaluation of American support to Mogadishu, suggesting that U.S. aid should not be used to underwrite policies that align more with Chinese interests than Western democratic principles.
Still, these reactions remain within the political margins. Official U.S. policy continues to recognise Somalia’s borders and advocates for peaceful dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. For most Western governments, the Somaliland issue is seen through the lens of African consensus—meaning that unless the African Union leads on recognising Somaliland, few are likely to take unilateral action. This leaves Hargeisa in a kind of diplomatic limbo: celebrated for its democracy, stability, and institutions, yet never granted full legitimacy by the states that claim to champion those values.
In the immediate term, the diplomatic rupture between Somalia and Taiwan—and the parallel tensions within Somaliland—will likely harden the positions of all actors. Somalia is unlikely to permit further Taiwanese engagement in its northern region without protest. Somaliland will continue to assert its right to independent diplomacy. Taiwan, emboldened by its symbolic inroads, may press ahead with cooperation, albeit cautiously. Meanwhile, the Awdal and SSC-Khaatumo movements will deepen the fragmentation of Somaliland’s internal cohesion, further weakening its international pitch for unity and legitimacy.
There is also the real risk that Somaliland’s current isolation will drive it closer to any state willing to recognise it, irrespective of international norms. Its flirtation with Ethiopia—signalled by the port access MoU—demonstrates that it is willing to play its few diplomatic cards boldly, if not always wisely. Should Ethiopia take more definitive steps toward recognising Somaliland, the situation could spiral into a regional diplomatic crisis. Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia would be compelled to respond, with consequences for regional trade, border agreements, and even military cooperation.
The African Union, thus far largely silent, may be called upon to mediate. But the AU’s record on secessionist matters is cautious. From Biafra to Banjul, its position has always been to respect colonial borders and discourage fragmentation. This is unlikely to change in Somaliland’s case unless a full-fledged diplomatic consensus emerges—an outcome that currently seems improbable.
A Fragile Equilibrium
What this entire episode illustrates is the fragility of political constructs in post-colonial Africa, where territorial boundaries are treated as sacred, even when they conflict with grassroots realities. Somalia is within its legal rights to assert its sovereignty and to object to foreign interference in what it views as an integral part of its territory. But it must also reckon with the practical reality that Somaliland has governed itself for over three decades and is not a passive actor in its own future. Similarly, Taiwan’s outreach, while pragmatic and diplomatically clever, risks entrenching divides rather than resolving them.
The tensions now radiating from Hargeisa, Mogadishu, and Taipei are unlikely to abate in the near term. Each actor is operating from a position shaped by existential priorities—be it Somalia’s territorial integrity, Somaliland’s yearning for legitimacy, or Taiwan’s desperate need for diplomatic breathing room. None is likely to retreat without serious compromise.
What remains, then, is a precarious equilibrium. The Horn of Africa, already burdened with transnational insurgencies, droughts, and migration crises, cannot afford another protracted conflict. A diplomatic escalation—particularly one that draws in external patrons like China and the United States—could destabilise not just Somalia or Somaliland, but the entire region. For African mediators, international diplomats, and regional leaders, the current standoff must be addressed with sober urgency.
Somalia’s passport ban on Taiwan may seem like a symbolic gesture, but in international relations, symbols matter. In this case, it is a signal: that the contest over sovereignty and recognition, far from being settled, remains very much alive.
Sources:
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Reuters – Somalia bans entry to Taiwan passport holders amid Somaliland dispute reuters.com
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Radio Dalsan – Somali government cites sovereignty concerns over Taiwan’s planned Somaliland visit radiodalsan.com
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Hiiraan Online – Somali Defence Minister: Taiwan’s unapproved Somaliland visit violated Somalia’s unity hiiraan.com
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AP News – China praises Somalia for upholding one-China principle in passport ban apnews.com
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Garowe Online – Ex-Foreign Minister Fiqi: Taiwan backing Somaliland separatism, training local forces garoweonline.com
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The Somali Digest – Awdal’s Lughaya elders reject Somaliland-Ethiopia deal, pledge loyalty to Somalia thesomalidigest.com
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Black Agenda Report – Advisor: People of Awdal and SSC want unity with Somalia, not Somaliland blackagendareport.com
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Kaab TV – Clan militia clashes in Somaliland amid political tensions with opposition figures en.kaabtv.com
