South Sudan’s independence was an event; its statehood remains an unfinished process. The country acquired the full legal apparatus of sovereignty in 2011—territory, flag, constitution, UN membership—yet never developed the administrative “gravity” that turns legal authority into predictable public action. The result is a familiar but under-analysed condition: ministries that exist as portfolios rather than machines; budgets that exist as documents rather than controls; elections and peace agreements that rearrange office-holders while leaving the operating system largely intact. [UNMIS Referendum in Southern Sudan (2011)], [Reuters, 15 Jul 2011]. (United Nations Peacekeeping)
The practical diagnosis is not moral or humanitarian. It is systems-based. South Sudan’s core problem is that the instruments that make a state legible to itself—registries, ledgers, payroll, procurement rules, cash management, audit trails, courts that can enforce—have not become authoritative enough to discipline either politics or spending. Where administrative gravity is weak, political bargaining does not translate into implementation; and where implementation is unreliable, political settlements become permanently provisional.
Independence as a legal event; statehood as an operating discipline
On 9 July 2011, South Sudan proclaimed independence after a referendum in which 98.83% of participants voted to secede; within days it entered the UN system as the 193rd member state, and its Transitional Constitution came into force. [UNMIS Referendum in Southern Sudan (2011)], [Reuters, 15 Jul 2011], [Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011]. (United Nations Peacekeeping)
That sequence matters. It illustrates a structural asymmetry: international recognition can be fast, binary, and legal; statehood is slow, cumulative, and operational. A functioning state is not the presence of ministries, but the presence of routines that make ministries consequential: a budget calendar that is followed, a payroll that is verified, a treasury that can see (and therefore limit) commitments, and a legal system that can enforce decisions without improvisation. Governance, in this sense, is not a set of intentions; it is an equilibrium of rules, information, and enforcement capacity. [World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law]. (World Bank)
South Sudan inherited the most difficult starting conditions for that operational journey: a liberation movement converting into a state, a narrow revenue base, contested monopoly of force, and a political economy organised around rents. But those are risk factors, not explanations. Many countries share them; fewer remain stuck. The differentiator is whether early sovereignty is used to build a minimal administrative spine, or whether sovereignty is consumed by elite accommodation and fiscal improvisation.
The absence of administrative gravity: where the state cannot pull
“Administrative gravity” describes the state’s ability to pull information, money, and compliance towards the centre—to make rules and allocations stick. In South Sudan, the evidence points the other way: persistent inability to convert revenue into regular salaries; repeated resort to arrears and monetisation; weak fiscal reporting; and chronic discontinuity in key economic posts.
Start with the macro-fiscal picture. The World Bank’s Macro Poverty Outlook reports a severe fiscal crisis following prolonged oil disruption, with the deficit widening to 4.9% of GDP in FY24 from a surplus in FY23; nine months of salary arrears; and annual average inflation surging to 183% in FY25, alongside a sharp currency depreciation. Extreme poverty is reported to have risen from 76.5% (2016) to nearly 91% (2025). [World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook: South Sudan (2025)]. (The World Bank Documents)
Those outcomes are not only “fragility”; they are systems failure. A state that cannot pay its civil servants on time cannot credibly enforce policy. Worse, arrears become a substitute for decisions: instead of choosing what not to fund, the system funds everything on paper and then simply does not pay.
The IMF’s 2024 staff report under the Staff-Monitored Program is unusually explicit about the operational breakdown. It notes that public wages were not paid in the first half of 2024, pushing arrears to eight months by end-June, and that budget processes were impaired because the authorities could not access the budget execution software for several months, impeding timely and granular data compilation. [IMF Country Report No. 24/327 (2024)]. (IMF)
That one line about software access is more revealing than many pages of political commentary. It captures the essence of a state without administrative gravity: the centre cannot reliably see its own transactions, so it cannot discipline them. In such an environment, “policy” becomes a negotiation over exceptions, not a system of rules.
Ministries without systems; budgets without controls
South Sudan has formal structures for public financial management (PFM), including legislation and a finance ministry. The issue is not the absence of forms but the absence of enforcement machinery.
The IMF’s 2024 technical assistance summary on strengthening budget execution describes weak expenditure controls, poor commitment control, cumbersome and error-prone paper-based payment processes, delays in in-year fiscal reporting, and—most starkly—annual financial statements not prepared since 2011. It also notes that the Public Finance Management and Accountability Act provides a foundation, but that without regulations and procedures the legal provisions are not enforced in practice. [IMF HLS TA Report: South Sudan—Strengthening Budget Execution (Feb 2024)]. (IMF)
This is what “ministries without systems” looks like. The ministry exists, the act exists, sometimes even the software exists, yet the operational chain—commitment control, cash limits, payment authorisation, reconciliation, reporting, audit—does not reliably function end to end. In that gap, public money is governed by discretion and urgency rather than by controls and predictability.
The Government’s own PFM reform roadmap (produced through the PFM Oversight Committee) is candid about the need to “get the basics right”, explicitly stating that reforms should prioritise control over the use of public resources, centralised cash management (a Treasury Single Account), timely accounting, regular reports, and audit reporting to the legislature—before moving to more ambitious performance and service-delivery reforms. [MoFP Roadmap: Implementing PFM Priorities in the R-ARCSS (Jan 2021)]. (mofp.gov.ss)
That sequencing logic is orthodox—but in South Sudan it has not been politically protected. Without political protection, sequencing becomes a slogan; and without sequencing, reform becomes a carousel of partial initiatives that never acquire authority.
Oil as revenue; oil as a governance solvent
The fiscal system is further weakened by a narrow and volatile revenue base. When oil flows, it enables short-term accommodation; when it stops, it exposes the absence of buffers and controls.
The World Bank’s South Sudan Economic Monitor (Issue 7) describes the 2024 oil shock with operational specificity: the BAPCO pipeline that usually carries nearly 70% of production to Port Sudan was shut down; output averaged around 122,000 bpd in FY24 (down from 139,000 bpd in FY23), and only around 60,000 bpd since February 2024—implying forgone export revenues estimated at US$6.8 million per day. Oil exports are estimated to have declined by 16% in FY24 to US$3.7 billion. It also reports gross international reserves falling to around 0.3 months of imports in FY24. [World Bank South Sudan Economic Monitor, Issue 7 (2025)]. (World Bank)
The IMF similarly notes the shock from pipeline damage and the resulting fiscal compression and arrears. [IMF Country Report No. 24/327 (2024)], [IMF Press Release: 2023 Article IV & SMP Reviews (Jun 2024)]. (IMF)
Oil dependence does not only create macroeconomic volatility; it dissolves institutional incentives. If the state can finance itself through a narrow rent channel, the pressure to build a broad tax administration, credible budgets, and enforceable procurement rules is weakened. When revenues collapse, the state then lacks the administrative depth to adjust cleanly, so it falls back on arrears and monetisation—further eroding legitimacy and capability.
Discontinuity as a governance signature
In environments of weak systems, personnel changes become a substitute for reform: when outputs are missing, leadership turnover creates the appearance of action. It also destroys institutional memory.
The World Bank’s Macro Poverty Outlook explicitly flags “frequent changes in key leadership positions” as a contributor to policy uncertainty. [World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook: South Sudan (2025)]. (The World Bank Documents) In the same vein, Reuters reported in August 2025 that South Sudan had replaced its finance minister for the seventh time since 2020. [Reuters, 22 Aug 2025]. (Reuters)
For an operating state, continuity in the fiscal core—finance, treasury, revenue, central bank—matters as much as technical design. Systems take time to bed in. If senior stewardship churns, reform becomes episodic, and administrative gravity never accumulates.
Why elections, constitutions, and peace agreements do not substitute for institutions
South Sudan’s political calendar illustrates a recurring misconception: that formal political milestones can generate state capacity. They cannot. Elections can legitimise authority, but they do not create payroll systems. Constitutions can define offices, but they do not create cash controls. Peace agreements can allocate positions, but they do not create audit trails.
This is not an argument against elections or constitutionalism. It is an argument about category error. In South Sudan, the architecture of political settlement has repeatedly been asked to do the work of administrative construction.
The Revitalised Agreement (R-ARCSS) of 2018 is a comprehensive settlement on paper; it also includes governance and economic reform provisions. [R-ARCSS (2018)]. (docs.pca-cpa.org) Yet repeated extensions and delays have turned the transitional period into a semi-permanent mode of rule. In September 2024, the government postponed elections again, moving them to 22 December 2026 and extending the transition by two years. [Reuters, 13 Sep 2024]. (Reuters)
International actors have increasingly treated these extensions as a proxy for institutional failure. In February 2025, at the Security Council, briefers warned of limited political will and emphasised the need to implement outstanding benchmarks rather than extend the transition again. [UN Security Council Press Release, 5 Feb 2025]. (UN Press)
The deeper point is behavioural. When institutions are weak, political elites rationally prefer negotiable arrangements (roadmaps, extensions, “reconstituted” commissions) over binding systems (verifiable payroll, enforceable procurement, independent audit). Negotiable arrangements preserve discretion. Binding systems constrain it. That is why formal events recur while state capacity does not.
The problem is not “lack of plans”; it is lack of enforceable routines
South Sudan does not suffer from a shortage of plans, frameworks, or externally supported initiatives. It suffers from the inability of any given plan to become operationally dominant.
The IMF technical assistance report notes that the legal framework exists, but regulations and procedures have not translated it into enforceable practice; it highlights the need to strengthen commitment control, cash management, fiscal reporting, and to implement a Treasury Single Account with usable scope. [IMF HLS TA Report: Strengthening Budget Execution (Feb 2024)]. (IMF)
The World Bank’s PFM and Institutional Strengthening project appraisal offers a historically grounded detail: prior to renewed conflict, IFMIS core modules were introduced and expanded from 2011–2014 across states and some line ministries; the 2016 conflict disrupted many programmes. It also notes a practical lesson from FCV environments: substantial improvements are more feasible in restoring basic fiscal control and recording/reporting than in implementing advanced reforms such as full medium-term expenditure frameworks. [World Bank PFM & Institutional Strengthening Project (2022)]. (World Bank)
That is an institutional diagnosis, not a technical one. The state’s first requirement is not sophisticated policy design; it is the creation of routines that cannot be bypassed.
Lessons for other fragile or post-conflict states (Sahel, Horn of Africa)
South Sudan is not unique. The Sahel and parts of the Horn face analogous patterns: coercive authority contested; revenues narrow; external security assistance substituting for domestic control; and political settlements repeatedly “reset” without building enforceable administrative machinery. The transferable lesson is to stop treating formal governance milestones as if they were governance capability.
OECD’s States of Fragility 2025 frames fragility as multidimensional and persistent, with high and extreme fragility concentrated among a large share of the world’s extreme poor—an argument for focusing less on episodic political events and more on institutional fundamentals. [OECD States of Fragility 2025]. (OECD)
Three lessons follow.
First, sovereignty should be treated as a container, not a capability. International recognition and peace agreements can create space, but they do not fill it. External partners should therefore stop designing interventions as if the existence of a ministry implies the existence of a ministry system.
Second, the fiscal spine is the quickest route to administrative gravity. In fragile contexts, “service delivery” strategies that bypass fiscal systems can achieve outputs, but they postpone state formation. The more durable strategy is to make basic PFM non-bypassable: credible budget releases, verifiable payroll, commitment controls, and routine fiscal reporting. This is not glamorous, but it is decisive.
Third, sequencing is political, not procedural. Everyone agrees that reforms should be sequenced; fewer protect sequencing from elite incentives. In rent-based systems, the political centre will default towards discretion. Sequencing therefore requires a political bargain: elites accept constraints in return for predictability, external support, and reduced existential risk.
What “sequencing governance” looks like in reality
Sequencing governance should be understood as a set of gates, not a timetable. Each gate is a minimum capability without which the next layer becomes performative. South Sudan’s own PFM roadmap outlines an order—controls, then aggregate discipline, then service delivery orientation—that can be generalised beyond finance. [MoFP Roadmap: Implementing PFM Priorities (Jan 2021)]. (mofp.gov.ss)
A realistic sequencing model would have five gates.
Gate 1: A verifiable payroll and a cash-limited budget.
A state that cannot verify who it pays cannot control anything else. Payroll must be linked to identity, position, and attendance, with removals as credible as additions. In parallel, spending limits must follow cash availability, not budget aspirations, and commitment controls must prevent ministries from creating arrears as a shadow financing mechanism. The IMF identifies weak commitment control and cash management as core weaknesses, and highlights TSA implementation as a priority. [IMF HLS TA Report: Strengthening Budget Execution (Feb 2024)]. (IMF)
Gate 2: A single view of cash (Treasury Single Account in practice, not in name).
Fragmented accounts create fragmented authority. A TSA is not a technical accessory; it is the foundation of central control. The IMF notes persistent challenges: cash plans not effectively used, weak forecast accuracy, and narrow TSA scope limiting cash pooling benefits. [IMF HLS TA Report: Strengthening Budget Execution (Feb 2024)]. (IMF)
Gate 3: Routine fiscal reporting and closure of the accounts.
If annual financial statements have not been prepared since 2011, accountability remains fictional. The point is not perfection; it is routine. Quarterly in-year reports, reconciliation between treasury and bank, and an audited annual statement, even if qualified, create a baseline against which politics can be disciplined. The IMF report’s remark that annual statements have not been prepared since 2011 is the clearest indicator of how far the state remains from this gate. [IMF HLS TA Report: Strengthening Budget Execution (Feb 2024)]. (IMF)
Gate 4: Rule-bound procurement and basic contract enforceability.
Once cash and reporting begin to stabilise, procurement becomes the key leakage point. Without transparent tendering and enforceable contracts, spending becomes patronage. This gate depends on courts (or credible arbitration) that can enforce decisions without political negotiation. The World Bank’s PFM project framing—prioritising basic controls over advanced reforms—supports this incremental approach. [World Bank PFM & Institutional Strengthening Project (2022)]. (World Bank)
Gate 5: Political milestones only after operational baselines.
Elections held before these gates are met do not consolidate the state; they intensify contestation over a rent pool administered without controls. South Sudan’s repeated election delays and transitional extensions are, in part, an implicit recognition that operational prerequisites are missing. But the error is to treat “more time” as the solution. The solution is to treat these gates as preconditions, with public, measurable criteria (payroll verification completed; TSA scope expanded; accounts closed; audited statements published; procurement rules enforced).
This is what differentiates sequencing governance from governance theatre: it makes reform non-optional and measurable, and it reduces the space in which political agreements can substitute for administrative reality.
A closing judgement: the state is the system that outlasts the agreement
South Sudan’s story is often told as a tragedy of conflict and unmet peace. That is accurate but incomplete. The more strategic reading is that sovereignty arrived before the state’s operating system, and that subsequent political settlements have been forced to carry an impossible load: they are asked to govern without administrative gravity.
The path out is not a new agreement, a new constitution, or a new electoral calendar in isolation. It is the slow construction of enforceable routines—beginning with the fiscal spine—that make decisions legible, payments predictable, and authority operational. That is unglamorous work. It is also the only work that turns statehood from a status into a capability.
