Earning the Wage Bill

A Sector-by-Sector Performance Framework for the Mauritian Civil Service (2026–2035), aligned to the Productivity–Fiscal Compact

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This report sets out a practical performance framework for the Mauritian civil service for the period **2026–2035**, built explicitly on the critiques and reform logic articulated in *STI-TRG0001 – The Price of the State* and on the implementation realities of **PRB 2026**. It treats the public sector pay settlement not as a standalone labour-market event, but as a long-term governance choice that must be earned through demonstrable improvements in service delivery, productivity and fiscal discipline. Accordingly, the paper translates macro-level principles into enforceable departmental instruments: a small, publishable set of Key Performance Indicators per sector and department; clear ownership and escalation rules; minimum viable data lineage and assurance; and an implementation roadmap that is administratively survivable. The intention is not to add another layer of reporting; it is to make performance legible enough that Cabinet, fiscal authorities and senior administrators can manage trade-offs deliberately, rather than discovering them later as "unfortunate pressures".

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Preface & Acknowledgements

This document translates the reform logic, critiques, and recommendations set out in *STI-TRG0001 – The Price of the State* into an operational performance framework for the Mauritian civil service. It assumes a simple premise: if the State has decided to pay more, it must also decide—explicitly and measurably—what better looks like, how it will be observed, and what will happen when it does not materialise.

The framework is anchored in three realities highlighted in the underlying analysis. First, the **macro-fiscal envelope is narrow**, and public-sector pay revisions therefore behave less like routine HR adjustments and more like fiscal architecture. Second, the PRB process is not designed to enforce productivity; it can recommend performance systems, but it cannot make them bite. Third, "phasing" buys time, but it does not buy implementation capacity; it merely sets a deadline for seriousness.

The framework also draws on established measurement and public-sector productivity guidance, including OECD and ONS methodological anchors, and on wage-bill sustainability concepts used by the World Bank and IMF in small-state contexts. *[OECD Productivity Manual 2001], [ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019], [World Bank PFR Fundamentals: Public Wage Bill Analysis, June 2025], [IMF Country Report No. 25/136]*.

Executive Summary

Cabinet decided in December 2025 that PRB 2026 would be implemented in two phases—50 per cent from January 2026 and 100 per cent from January 2027—with the overall package (including integration of the interim 5 per cent allowance into salary) estimated at around Rs10.9 billion annually. [PMO, Highlights of Cabinet Decision, 19 December 2025].

The phasing decision is fiscally rational, but it is incomplete as a reform. It creates a window in which the State must prove a proposition that is rarely stated explicitly: that higher public pay will purchase observable improvements in delivery, productivity, and governance—fast enough to protect fiscal credibility. Without that proof, the State risks paying twice: once in money, and again in institutional authority.

This report therefore proposes a **Productivity–Fiscal Compact performance framework** built on four design choices drawn directly from *STI-TRG0001*:

1. **A small, published PRB-Plus dashboard** that tracks wage-bill sustainability and delivery performance quarterly, using indicators such as compensation of employees as a share of GDP and revenue, nominal wage-bill growth relative to nominal GDP growth, and a set of operational "drift" indicators (median turnaround times and backlogs in high-volume services). [World Bank PFR Fundamentals: Public Wage Bill Analysis, June 2025]; [IMF Country Report No. 25/136].

2. **Department-level KPI covenants** anchored in the services citizens actually experience (licences, benefits, permits, registrations, inspections, clinical pathways, and enforcement responses). In other words, productivity measured as **delivered outputs adjusted for quality**, not as raw activity counts—a key guardrail in public service measurement. [ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019]; [OECD Productivity Manual 2001].

3. **A hard line on "quiet drift" channels**—allowances, overtime, grade creep, and exception-making—by requiring rule enforcement, auditability, and a published diagnostic of allowance and overtime utilisation across ministries.

4. **A linkage to budget and people decisions that is practical rather than theatrical.** In year one, the linkage is primarily through transparency, escalation, and management consequences (service recovery plans, recruitment controls, redeployment decisions, and performance reviews). Once KPI integrity is established, the linkage can extend to structured career progression, higher-duties assignments, training priority, and (for senior leadership) performance contracts. This aligns with the PRB's own insistence that partial implementation may defeat the underlying spirit of the reform. [PRB, Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1, Introduction].

Three decisions are required at Cabinet level to make this operational:

- **Adopt a wage-bill anchor** (definitions and boundaries included), and mandate quarterly publication of the Compact dashboard.

- **Mandate an Integrated Performance Management Framework** across ministries and departments, consistent with PRB recommendations and aligned with programme-based budgeting and outcome reporting. [PRB Pay Review 2026; MoF performance-based budgeting direction].

- **Approve a phased implementation plan** with pilots in the highest-volume service agencies in 2026, expanding to full coverage by 2027—explicitly timed to the PRB phase-two implementation point.

A short quote from the anchor report captures the posture required: **"Phasing is not a reform. It is a timer."**

1. Framework architecture

1.1 The PRB-Plus logic in operational terms

The Compact treats the PRB award as a **purchase order**: the State has agreed to pay more; it must now specify what is being bought and how it will be verified. The verification cannot be left to annual rhetoric. It must be embedded in a quarterly rhythm, with a small number of indicators that are difficult to game and easy to interpret.

The approach is deliberately unromantic. "Transformation programmes" tend to fail when they require sustained enthusiasm; they succeed when they require sustained reporting. The Compact therefore privileges **repeatable measurement**, **clear ownership**, and **credible escalation** over elaborate strategy prose.

1.2 KPI taxonomy

Every department's KPI set is structured into four categories:

- **Output KPIs:** what the department produces (licences issued, inspections completed, cases resolved).

- **Outcome KPIs:** what changes for citizens, businesses, and the State (compliance rates, reduced repeat visits, improved safety, better learning/health indicators).

- **Efficiency KPIs:** cost, time, and resource optimisation (median turnaround time, backlog, cost per case, digital share).

- **Governance KPIs:** compliance, transparency, control effectiveness (audit findings, procurement compliance, publication timeliness, conflict-of-interest declarations, disciplinary timeliness).

This is not academic tidiness; it is anti-gaming architecture. Output without outcome becomes a factory quota applied to a courtroom. Outcome without efficiency becomes an aspiration with a rising unit cost. Governance without consequences becomes a filing cabinet.

1.3 Ownership, assurance, and escalation

Each KPI has four named roles:

1. **Policy owner:** Permanent Secretary / Director-General accountable for results.
2. **Operational owner:** Head of service line accountable for day-to-day execution.

3. **Data owner:** Head of statistics/MIS responsible for data lineage and integrity.
4. **Assurance owner:** Internal audit (and periodic external review) responsible for verification.

⊕ Cadence
- **Monthly:** internal management pack (department).
- **Quarterly:** Compact dashboard to Cabinet committee; published summary.
- **Annually:** deep-dive performance review linked to programme budgets and establishment planning.

⊕ Escalation rules
- Two consecutive quarters **Red** on any "Compact critical" KPI triggers a **Service Recovery Plan** signed by the Accounting Officer, with an explicit diagnosis: process, people, policy, or technology.

- Persistent Red (three quarters) triggers a **resource and rules review**: redeployment authority, overtime controls, procurement acceleration, or policy simplification.

This is intentionally boring. It is also the point.

1.4 Linkage to budgeting and people decisions

The PRB and MoF already provide the building blocks: PRB recommends structured performance systems, and MoF has reaffirmed a shift to programme-based budgeting with explicit outputs, outcomes, and KPIs and progress reporting. *[PRB Pay Review 2026]; [MoF Finance and Audit Amendment speech, 18 March 2025].*

The Compact makes that linkage enforceable through three mechanisms:

- **Budget hearings use KPI evidence.** Programme bids without KPI baselines or data lineage are treated as incomplete.

- **Career progression becomes performance-gated (phased).** In year one, the gate is applied mainly to senior management appointments and higher-duties allocations; in later years, it can be extended carefully, once KPI quality is credible.

- **Institutional performance reviews become compulsory.** Each department must produce an annual "delivery and productivity statement" that reconciles headcount, wage costs, outputs, and service outcomes.

2. Scope: sectors and departments covered

The following list reflects the "core sectors and departments" identified through official Government listings and related departmental structures, and is used as the scope baseline for the KPI matrices below. (GIS Mauritius)

⊕ Core sectors as ministries
- Prime Minister's Office (PMO Mauritus)
- Ministry of Defence, Home Affairs and External Communications
- Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities
- Ministry of Education, Tertiary Education, Science and Technology
- Ministry of Local Government, Disaster and Risk Management
- Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade
- Ministry of Housing and Land Use Planning
- Ministry of Industrial Development, SMEs and Cooperatives
- Ministry of Environment, Solid Waste Management and Climate Change
- Ministry of Financial Services and Good Governance
- Ministry of Tourism
- Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Institutional Reforms
- Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security
- Ministry of Commerce and Consumer Protection
- Ministry of Youth Empowerment, Sports and Recreation
- Ministry of Information Technology, Communication and Innovation
- Ministry of Labour, Human Resource Development and Training
- Ministry of Health and Wellness
- Ministry of Blue Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping
- Ministry of Gender Equality and Family Welfare
- Ministry of Arts and Cultural Heritage
- Ministry of Public Service, Administrative and Institutional Reforms
- Ministry of National Infrastructure and Community Development

- Ministry of Social Security and National Solidarity
- Ministry of Social Integration and Economic Empowerment
- Ministry of Land Transport and Light Rail
- Police Department (GIS Mauritius)

⊕ Key departments and constitutional / oversight bodies
- Public Service Commission
- Local Government Service Commission
- Procurement Policy Office
- Statistics Mauritius
- Mauritius National Assembly
- Office of the Ombudsman
- National Human Rights Commission
- Office of the Electoral Commissioner
- Civil Status Division
- National Archives Department
- Corporate and Business Registration Department
- Department of Civil Aviation
- National Land Transport Authority
- Office for Ombudsperson for Financial Services
- National Arts Fund
- Irrigation Authority (GIS Mauritius)

3. The KPI matrices

⊕ How to read the matrices
Each department table below includes a pragmatic "starter set" of KPIs—deliberately limited in number to protect credibility and administrative capacity. The expectation is not that every KPI is perfect in Q1 2026; the expectation is that each KPI has an owner, a data source, a reporting cadence, and a public definition.

⊕ Compact alignment codes
- **P:** productivity improvement
- **F:** fiscal sustainability
- **Q:** service quality and delivery outcomes
- **G:** accountability and governance reform

⊕ PRB-Plus lever codes (traceability to STI-TRG0001 recommendations)
- **A:** Productivity covenant and service standards
- **B:** Wage-bill anchor and sustainability indicators
- **C:** Digital dividend and process redesign
- **D:** Allowances/overtime/grade creep control
- **E:** Dashboard, monitoring, and escalation architecture

3.1 Prime Minister's Office

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Cabinet decision implementation rate	Outcome	% of Cabinet decisions delivered by agreed deadline; target ≥ 85% quarterly	Cabinet tracking register; quarterly	Secretary to Cabinet / PMO PS	Q/G; E
Policy clearance cycle time	Efficiency	Median working days from submission to final inter-ministerial clearance; target: year-on-year reduction	Cabinet Office workflow; monthly	Cabinet Office	P/Q; A/E
Public release timeliness	Governance	% of major policy decisions published within defined window; target ≥ 95%	PMO publications log; quarterly	PMO Comms	G; E
Cross-government delivery blockage resolution	Output	# of cross-ministerial "blockers" resolved per quarter with documented resolution route	Delivery unit log; quarterly	PMO Delivery Cell	P/Q; A/E
Complaints escalation closure	Efficiency	% escalated citizen cases closed within 20 working days; target ≥ 90%	Citizen relations logs; quarterly	PMO Citizen Desk	Q; A
Integrity disclosures for senior appointments	Governance	% of designated appointments with complete disclosure pack before nomination; target 100%	Appointment files; quarterly	PMO Governance Unit	G; E

Implementation note: PMO KPIs must stay small and high-signal. This is not a ministry that "produces" widgets; it produces coherence. The relevant outputs are therefore timeliness, follow-through, and the ability to unblock delivery across the machine.

3.2 Ministry of Public Service, Administrative and Institutional Reforms

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
IPMF coverage rate	Governance	% of ministries/departments operating under a published KPI framework with named owners; target ≥ 90% by end-2027	IPMF registry; quarterly	MPSAIR PS	G; A/E
Vacancy fill cycle time	Efficiency	Median days from vacancy approval to posting filled; target: reduction year-on-year	HRMIS/PSC data; monthly	HR Directorate	P/F; A
Allowances and overtime drift index	Efficiency	Allowances+overtime as % of basic salary in pilot ministries; target: no growth without justification	Payroll; quarterly	HR Policy Unit	F/G; D/E
Workforce mobility utilisation	Output	# staff redeployed across ministries under formal mobility scheme; target increases annually	HR redeployment records; quarterly	HR Policy Unit	P/F; D
Training-to-need conversion	Outcome	% of training programmes linked to measured service bottlenecks with post-training productivity delta; target ≥ 70%	Training logs + KPI change; annual	Civil Service College	P/Q; C
Disciplinary case timeliness	Governance	% disciplinary cases closed within PRB/PSC timelines; target ≥ 85%	Case management; quarterly	HR Discipline Unit	G/Q; E

Traceability: PRB's recommendation for an Integrated Performance Management Framework, implemented in consultation with MoF, is explicit; this ministry is the system owner.

3.3 Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Wage-bill sustainability indicators published	Governance	Quarterly publication of compensation of employees as % GDP, % revenue, % expenditure, and growth vs nominal GDP; target: 100% on time	Treasury + macro unit; quarterly	Financial Secretary	F/G; B/E
Budget execution variance	Efficiency	Absolute variance of actual vs voted recurrent expenditure by programme; target: within tolerance bands	IFMIS; quarterly	Accountant-General	F/G; E
Procurement cycle time for priority projects	Efficiency	Median days from tender launch to award for priority categories; target: reduction year-on-year	e-Procurement portal; quarterly	Procurement directorate	P/F; C
Programme KPI coverage in budget	Output	% programmes with defined outputs/outcomes/KPIs and baselines; target: ≥ 80% by FY2027/28	Budget book + PBB annex; annual	Budget Division	P/F; A
Fiscal data boundary statement	Governance	Publication of a plain-language "coverage note" for wage bill and debt aggregates with definitional changes; target: annual	MoF publications; annual	Macro Unit	G/F; B
Public accounts timeliness	Output	Accounts laid within statutory/target timeframe; target: 100%	Treasury; annual	Accountant-General	G; E

Implementation note: MoF is co-owner of the Compact. The dashboard is not merely informational; it is the mechanism that keeps the PRB decision inside a credible medium-term framework.
Relevant external anchors: [IMF Country Report No. 25/136]; [World Bank PFR Fundamentals, June 2025]. (IMF)

3.4 Public Service Commission

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Recruitment cycle time	Efficiency	Median days from requisition to appointment; target: reduction year-on-year	PSC recruitment system; quarterly	PSC Secretary	P/Q; A
Merit compliance rate	Governance	% recruitment exercises with complete audit trail and no adverse findings; target: ≥ 98%	Internal audit; annual	PSC	G; E
Candidate pipeline adequacy	Outcome	Ratio of qualified candidates to vacancies in scarce-skill grades; target improves	HR analytics; quarterly	PSC + MPSAIR	P; C
Appeals resolution time	Efficiency	Median days to resolve recruitment appeals; target: within set SLA	Appeals log; quarterly	PSC	Q/G; E
Digital recruitment share	Efficiency	% applications end-to-end digital; target: ≥ 90%	e-Recruitment; quarterly	PSC ICT	P/Q; C
Probation confirmation timeliness	Output	% probation decisions completed by due date; target: ≥ 95%	HRMIS; quarterly	PSC	Q/G; A

3.5 Local Government Service Commission

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Local authority recruitment cycle time	Efficiency	Median days for priority local authority posts; target: reduction year-on-year	LGSC records; quarterly	LGSC	P/Q; A
Staffing vacancy rate in critical services	Outcome	Vacancy rate in waste, drainage, enforcement; target: within agreed band	Establishment register; quarterly	LGSC + Local Gov	Q/F; A
Merit compliance	Governance	% exercises with complete audit trail; target ≥ 98%	Audit; annual	LGSC	G; E
Redeployment rate within local gov	Output	# redeployments executed to relieve bottlenecks; target increases	LGSC; quarterly	LGSC	P/F; D
Disciplinary timeliness	Governance	% cases closed within timeline; target ≥ 85%	Case logs; quarterly	LGSC	G; E
Training-to-role match	Efficiency	% hires in scarce skills completing role-linked induction within 6 months; target ≥ 90%	HR/training; annual	LGSC	P/Q; C

3.6 Procurement Policy Office

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Compliance rate with procurement rules	Governance	% sampled procurements compliant; target increases annually	Audit sampling; quarterly	PPO	G/F; E
Publication timeliness	Governance	% tenders/awards published within mandated timeframe; target 100%	e-Procurement; monthly	PPO	G; E
Bid protest resolution time	Efficiency	Median days to resolve procurement complaints; target: within SLA	PPO log; quarterly	PPO	Q/G; E
Competition index	Outcome	Average valid bids per tender in key categories; target: non-declining	e-Procurement; quarterly	PPO	F/Q; C
Framework contract utilisation	Efficiency	% eligible purchases through frameworks; target: increase	IFMIS + procurement; quarterly	PPO + MoF	F; C
Contract variation rate	Governance	% contracts with value/time variations above threshold; target: reduction	Contract mgmt; quarterly	PPO	G/F; E

(Data-source realism note: Mauritius operates an e-Procurement environment and publishes procurement information online, enabling automated KPI extraction.) ([eProcurement](#))

3.7 Statistics Mauritius

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Release calendar adherence	Governance	% statistical releases published on schedule; target ≥ 98%	Release calendar; quarterly	Director	G; E
Revision transparency	Governance	% major revisions accompanied by methodological note; target 100%	Methodology notes; quarterly	Director	G/F; B
Data request turnaround	Efficiency	Median days to fulfil official data requests; target: reduction	Request log; monthly	Stats Mauritius	Q; A
Administrative data integration	Output	# new admin datasets integrated into official statistics annually	Integration programme; annual	Stats Mauritius	P/F; C
Open-data publication rate	Output	# datasets updated to schedule on open-data portal; target ≥ 90%	data.govmu.org	Stats Mauritius	Q/G; E
Quality assurance audit	Governance	Annual internal QA report published; target 100%	QA report; annual	Director	G; E

(Mauritius has an official open-data portal, which supports automated update tracking.) (data.govmu.org)

3.8 Mauritius National Assembly

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Timeliness of committee reports	Output	% scheduled reports tabled within planned session window; target ≥ 85%	Assembly records; sessional	Clerk	G; E
PAC follow-up closure	Outcome	% PAC recommendations with documented executive response within 90 days; target ≥ 90%	PAC tracker; quarterly	Clerk + MoF liaison	G/F; E
Publication of proceedings	Governance	% proceedings published within set timeframe; target ≥ 95%	Hansard system; quarterly	Clerk	G; E
Questions response rate	Output	% PQs answered within rules; target ≥ 95%	Assembly records; quarterly	Clerk	G; E
Digital access uptime	Efficiency	Uptime for online proceedings/document access; target ≥ 99%	ICT logs; monthly	Assembly ICT	Q; C
Ethics process timeliness	Governance	Timely handling of disclosures as required; target 100%	Secretariat records; annual	Clerk	G; E

3.9 Office of the Ombudsman

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Complaint closure time	Efficiency	Median days to close complaint; target: reduction	Case system; quarterly	Ombudsman Secretariat	Q; A
Backlog over-threshold rate	Efficiency	% cases older than 180 days; target: reduction	Case system; quarterly	Secretariat	Q/G; E
Recommendation adoption rate	Outcome	% recommendations adopted by agencies within 6 months; target increases	Follow-up tracker; quarterly	Secretariat	G/Q; E
Publication of annual report	Governance	Report published within statutory/target period; 100%	Annual report; annual	Secretariat	G; E
Service accessibility	Outcome	% complainants using digital/assisted channels without repeat visits; target improves	Surveys; annual	Secretariat	Q; C
Integrity and confidentiality compliance	Governance	0 material breaches; audited annually	Internal audit; annual	Secretariat	G; E

3.10 National Human Rights Commission

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Case resolution time	Efficiency	Median days to resolve admissible cases; target: reduction	Case logs; quarterly	Executive Secretary	Q; A
Investigation quality	Outcome	% cases upheld on review (proxy for robustness); target stable/improving	Review outcomes; annual	Commission	Q/G; E
Outreach coverage	Output	# targeted outreach sessions to vulnerable groups; target increases	Programme logs; quarterly	Commission	Q; A
Publication timeliness	Governance	Annual report on time; 100%	Annual report; annual	Commission	G; E
Recommendation adoption	Outcome	% recommendations acted on by agencies; target increases	Follow-up tracker; quarterly	Commission	G/Q; E
Data protection compliance	Governance	0 material breaches; annual audit	Audit; annual	Secretariat	G; E

3.11 Office of the Electoral Commissioner

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Register accuracy actions	Output	# corrections processed within SLA; target ≥ 95% within timeframe	Electoral register system; quarterly	Commissioner	Q; A
Polling readiness milestones	Outcome	% readiness milestones met by date (logistics, training); target 100%	Readiness plan; quarterly during cycle	Commissioner	Q/G; E
Complaint resolution time	Efficiency	Median days to resolve electoral complaints; target: within SLA	Complaints log; quarterly	Commissioner	Q/G; E
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major procurement breaches; annual audit	Audit; annual	Commissioner	G; E
ICT security posture	Governance	Annual security assessment completed; 100%	ICT audit; annual	ICT lead	G; C
Public communication timeliness	Output	Timely publication of notices; target 100%	Publication log; cycle-based	Commissioner	Q; A

3.12 Civil Status Division

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Certificates issued	Output	# certificates (birth/death/marriage) issued per month (by channel)	Registry system; monthly	Registrar	Q; A
Turnaround time	Efficiency	Median working days per certificate type; target: reduce and publish service standards	Registry system; monthly	Registrar	P/Q; A/E
First-time-right rate	Outcome	% applications processed without rework due to errors/missing info; target ≥ 95%	QA sampling; quarterly	Registrar	Q; A
Digital end-to-end share	Efficiency	% requests completed end-to-end digitally; target increase annually	e-Service logs; quarterly	ICT lead	P/Q; C
Integrity control exceptions	Governance	# material irregularities detected; target: declining; plus closure within 30 days	Internal controls; quarterly	Registrar	G; E
Complaint closure time	Efficiency	Median days to resolve citizen complaints; target: within SLA	Complaints log; quarterly	Registrar	Q; E

3.13 National Archives Department

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Cataloguing throughput	Output	# items catalogued/processed per quarter (with QA sampling)	Archives system; quarterly	Director	Q; A
Digitisation rate	Output	# priority records digitised per quarter; target increases annually	Digitisation logs; quarterly	Director	P/Q; C
Access request turnaround	Efficiency	Median days to fulfil access requests; target: reduction	Request log; quarterly	Reading Room lead	Q; A
Preservation incidents	Outcome	# preventable preservation incidents; target: zero	Incident log; annual	Director	Q/G; E
Collection integrity audit	Governance	Annual inventory audit completed; 100%	Audit report; annual	Director	G; E
Public engagement	Outcome	Visitor satisfaction score; target stable/improving	Survey; annual	Director	Q; A

3.14 Corporate and Business Registration Department

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Registrations processed	Output	# incorporations/filings processed per month	Registrar system; monthly	Registrar	Q; A
Turnaround time	Efficiency	Median days to register/incorporate; target: reduction + published standard	e-Registry; monthly	Registrar	P/Q; A
Data accuracy	Outcome	% filings requiring correction post-registration; target ≤ threshold	QA; quarterly	Registrar	Q/G; E
Digital end-to-end share	Efficiency	% filings completed fully online; target increase	Portal logs; quarterly	ICT	P/Q; C
Compliance enforcement	Outcome	% overdue compliance cases actioned within 30 days	Compliance unit; quarterly	Registrar	G/Q; E
Audit findings closure	Governance	% audit findings closed within 90 days; target ≥ 90%	Internal audit; quarterly	Registrar	G; E

3.15 Department of Civil Aviation

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Safety oversight actions	Output	# audits/inspections completed vs plan; target ≥ 95%	Oversight plan; quarterly	Director	Q/G; A
Findings closure time	Outcome	% safety findings closed within timeline; target ≥ 90%	CAPA tracker; quarterly	Director	Q/G; E
Licensing turnaround	Efficiency	Median days for licensing actions; target reduction	Licensing logs; quarterly	Licensing head	Q; A
ICAO compliance score	Outcome	External compliance measures (where applicable) stable/improving	External audits; periodic	Director	Q/G; E
Incident reporting completeness	Governance	% incidents logged within 24 hours; target ≥ 98%	Incident system; monthly	Safety unit	G; E
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major breaches; annual	Audit	Director	G; E

3.16 Office for Ombudsperson for Financial Services

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Complaint resolution time	Efficiency	Median days to resolve complaint; target: within SLA	Case system; quarterly	Ombudsperson	Q; A
Upheld decision rate	Outcome	% decisions upheld on review (proxy for robustness); target stable	Review outcomes; annual	Office	Q/G; E
Backlog rate	Efficiency	% cases older than threshold; target reduction	Case system; quarterly	Office	Q; E
Publication timeliness	Governance	Annual report on time; 100%	Report	Office	G; E
Systemic issues flagged	Output	# systemic conduct issues escalated to regulator with evidence pack	Escalation log; quarterly	Office	G/Q; E
Data protection compliance	Governance	0 material breaches; annual audit	Audit	Office	G; E

3.17 Ministry of Defence, Home Affairs and External Communications

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Emergency response readiness	Outcome	% readiness milestones met for civil protection; target 100%	Readiness plan; quarterly	PS/Commissioner	Q; A/E
Border processing efficiency	Efficiency	Median processing time for key border services (where data exists); target reduction	Operational logs; monthly	Service head	P/Q; A/C
Communications service uptime	Efficiency	Uptime of critical government comms systems; target ≥ 99%	ICT logs; monthly	ICT head	Q; C
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major breaches; annual	Audit	PS	G; E
Allowances/overtime intensity	Efficiency	Allowances+overtime as % of basic salary in operational units; target controlled	Payroll; quarterly	HR head	F; D
Incident closure discipline	Governance	% operational incidents closed with after-action report within 30 days; target ≥ 90%	Incident system; quarterly	Ops head	G/Q; E

3.18 Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Institutional Reforms

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Case throughput	Output	# cases processed/resolved by service line (courts/registries where applicable)	Case systems; quarterly	PS	Q; A
Backlog over-threshold rate	Efficiency	% cases older than standard (by case type); target reduction	Judiciary/admin data; quarterly	Service heads	Q; A/E
Time to deliver administrative justice services	Efficiency	Median days for key registry services; target reduction	Registry logs; quarterly	Registrars	P/Q; A
Integrity of records	Governance	% files complete and traceable; target ≥ 98%	File audits; annual	PS	G; E
Human rights compliance actions	Outcome	% recommendations implemented within set timeline	Tracker; quarterly	PS	Q/G; E
Disciplinary timeliness	Governance	% cases closed within timeline; target ≥ 85%	HR case logs; quarterly	HR head	G; E

3.19 Police Department

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Response time	Outcome	Median response time to priority calls; target reduction	CAD logs; monthly	Commissioner	Q; A
Case clearance rate	Outcome	% cases cleared (by category) with quality checks; target improve	Case system; quarterly	CID heads	Q/G; A
Patrol coverage	Output	Patrol hours delivered vs plan; target ≥ 95%	Duty rosters; monthly	Divisional commanders	Q; A
Overtime intensity	Efficiency	Overtime hours per officer and per incident; target controlled	Payroll + duty logs; monthly	HR/Finance	F; D
Complaints and integrity cases	Governance	% complaints investigated and closed within timeline; target ≥ 90%	Internal affairs logs; quarterly	Professional standards	G; E
Evidence handling compliance	Governance	% compliance with chain-of-custody audits; target ≥ 98%	Audit; quarterly	Ops	G/Q; E

3.20 Ministry of Health and Wellness

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Outpatient waiting time	Outcome	Median waiting time in priority outpatient clinics; target reduction	Hospital MIS; monthly	PS + hospital CEOs	Q; A
Surgical backlog	Outcome	# patients beyond clinically safe timeframe; target reduction	Theatre lists; monthly	Clinical directors	Q; A/E
Primary care utilisation shift	Outcome	% ambulatory cases handled at primary level vs hospital; target improve	Health stats; quarterly	PS	P/Q; C
Cost per treated case	Efficiency	Expenditure per case mix–adjusted treated case (pilot); target stable/reducing	Finance + activity; quarterly	Finance head	F/P; B
Absenteeism rate	Efficiency	Sick leave days per FTE; target controlled	HRMIS; monthly	HR head	P/F; D
Audit and clinical governance compliance	Governance	% critical audit actions closed within 90 days; target ≥ 90%	Audit + governance	Quarterly	PS

Measurement guardrail: health outputs must be quality-adjusted; otherwise the KPI becomes a throughput incentive that no clinician should trust. [ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019].

3.21 Ministry of Education, Tertiary Education, Science and Technology

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Learning time delivered	Output	% planned instructional days delivered (net of closures); target ≥ 98%	School admin; termly	PS	Q; A
Attendance and dropout	Outcome	Attendance rate and dropout rate (by level); target improve	EMIS; termly	PS	Q; A
Teacher deployment efficiency	Efficiency	Vacancy rate in critical subjects/regions; target within band	HR deployment	Quarterly	HR head
Cost per pupil	Efficiency	Recurrent cost per pupil (by level) with transparency; target stable while outcomes improve	MoF + education	Annual	Finance head
Digital learning utilisation	Output	% schools using defined digital tools with measured usage; target increase	Platform analytics	Termly	ICT lead
Governance and safeguarding compliance	Governance	% schools meeting compliance checks; target ≥ 95%	Inspection reports	Annual	Inspectorate

3.22 Ministry of Labour, Human Resource Development and Training

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Work permit / labour service turnaround	Efficiency	Median days for key approvals/services; target reduction	Case systems	Monthly	PS
Training placement rate	Outcome	% trainees placed in employment within 6 months; target improve	Training provider data	Quarterly	Training director
Labour inspection coverage	Output	% planned inspections completed; target ≥ 95%	Inspection logs	Quarterly	Inspectorate
Dispute resolution time	Outcome	Median days to resolve disputes/conciliation; target reduction	Dispute logs	Quarterly	Service head
Cost per successful placement	Efficiency	Programme cost / placements; target reduction	MoF + programme	Annual	PS
Governance compliance	Governance	Audit findings closure within 90 days; target ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS

3.23 Ministry of Social Security and National Solidarity

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Benefit processing time	Efficiency	Median days from application to decision/payment; target reduction	Benefits system	Monthly	PS
Payment accuracy	Outcome	% payments correct first time (over/underpayments); target ≥ 99%	QA sampling	Quarterly	Finance head
Fraud and error savings	Outcome	Value of confirmed fraud/error prevented or recovered; target increase	Control unit	Quarterly	Control head
Digital application share	Efficiency	% applications submitted digitally end-to-end; target increase	Portal logs	Quarterly	ICT lead
Complaint resolution time	Efficiency	Median days to resolve complaints; target within SLA	Complaints log	Quarterly	Service head
Audit findings closure	Governance	% findings closed within 90 days; target ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS

3.24 Ministry of Social Integration and Economic Empowerment

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Beneficiary onboarding time	Efficiency	Median days to onboard eligible households; target reduction	Programme MIS	Quarterly	PS
Graduation rate	Outcome	% beneficiaries exiting support due to income improvement (with verification); target improve	Tracking surveys	Annual	Programme head
Targeting accuracy	Outcome	% support reaching eligible groups (proxy via audits); target improve	Audit + MIS	Annual	PS
Cost per successful outcome	Efficiency	Programme cost / verified graduations; target improve	MoF + MIS	Annual	Finance head
Case management completeness	Governance	% case files complete and updated; target ≥ 95%	File audit	Quarterly	Programme head
Partner performance compliance	Governance	% NGO/partner deliverables met; target ≥ 90%	Contract mgmt	Quarterly	PS

3.25 Ministry of Gender Equality and Family Welfare

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Case response timeliness	Outcome	% priority protection cases actioned within defined timeframe; target ≥ 90%	Case logs	Monthly	PS
Shelter and service utilisation	Output	Occupancy/utilisation vs capacity with quality checks	Service logs	Monthly	Service head
Repeat incident rate	Outcome	% repeat cases within 12 months (risk-adjusted); target reduction	Case tracking	Annual	PS
Inter-agency referral closure	Efficiency	Median days to close referrals (health, police, courts); target reduction	Referral log	Quarterly	PS
Data confidentiality compliance	Governance	0 material breaches; annual audit	Audit	PS	G; E
Audit and procurement compliance	Governance	Findings closure within 90 days; ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS

3.26 Ministry of Youth Empowerment, Sports and Recreation

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Programme participation	Output	# youth participants in flagship programmes; target increases with quality checks	Programme MIS	Quarterly	PS
Employment/education progression	Outcome	% participants in employment/education 6 months post-programme; target improve	Follow-up surveys	Quarterly	Programme head
Facility utilisation	Efficiency	Utilisation hours per facility vs cost; target improve	Facility logs	Quarterly	Facilities head
Event delivery timeliness	Output	% events delivered on schedule and budget	Event reports	Quarterly	PS
Safeguarding compliance	Governance	% facilities passing safeguarding checks; target ≥ 95%	Inspection	Annual	PS
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major breaches; annual	Audit	PS	G; E

3.27 Ministry of Arts and Cultural Heritage

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Heritage site maintenance compliance	Outcome	% priority sites meeting maintenance standard	Inspection	Annual	PS
Grants throughput	Output	# grants disbursed with complete files	Grant MIS	Quarterly	Grants head
Visitor satisfaction	Outcome	Satisfaction score at managed sites; target improve	Surveys	Annual	Site managers
Cost per visitor	Efficiency	Operating cost per visitor (selected sites); target stable/improving	Finance + attendance	Annual	Finance head
Grants integrity	Governance	% grants with post-award verification completed; target ≥ 95%	Verification	Quarterly	Grants head
Publication transparency	Governance	Timely publication of grant lists and criteria; 100%	Website	Annual	PS

3.28 National Arts Fund

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Application processing time	Efficiency	Median days from submission to decision; target reduction	Fund MIS	Quarterly	CEO/Director
Portfolio diversity	Outcome	Share of funding across disciplines and regions within policy parameters	Grant data	Annual	Board
Post-award reporting compliance	Governance	% grantees submitting reports on time; target ≥ 90%	Grant monitoring	Quarterly	Fund
Event/output delivery	Output	% funded projects delivered as contracted; target ≥ 90%	Monitoring	Quarterly	Fund
Audit findings closure	Governance	Closure within 90 days; ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	Fund
Digital application share	Efficiency	% applications processed end-to-end digitally; target increase	Portal logs	Quarterly	ICT

3.29 Ministry of Information Technology, Communication and Innovation

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Digital end-to-end transactions	Output	# priority services redesigned to be end-to-end digital (no counter step)	Service catalogue	Quarterly	PS
Service uptime	Efficiency	Uptime of core platforms; target ≥ 99%	Monitoring	Monthly	CIO
Adoption rate	Outcome	% eligible users using digital channel for priority services	Analytics	Quarterly	PS
Cost-to-serve reduction	Efficiency	Unit cost reduction for digitised services (pilot); target improves	Finance + analytics	Annual	PS + MoF
Cybersecurity controls	Governance	Completion of annual security assessment and remediation rate; target 100%	Security audits	Annual	CIO
Procurement delivery discipline	Governance	% IT projects delivered within ±10% time/budget with user acceptance	PMO logs	Quarterly	PS

(This aligns with the Government's own digital transformation blueprint direction and emphasis on delivery rather than procurement theatre.) (nationalbudget2025.govmu.org)

3.30 Ministry of Local Government, Disaster and Risk Management

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Waste collection reliability	Outcome	% scheduled collections completed on time (pilot councils); target ≥ 95%	Council logs	Monthly	PS + councils
Drainage and flooding response	Outcome	Median hours to respond to priority events; target reduction	Incident logs	Quarterly	Service head
Permit processing time	Efficiency	Median days for key local permits; target reduction	Permit logs	Quarterly	Councils
Cost per service unit	Efficiency	Cost per tonne collected / per km maintained; target improve	Finance + ops	Quarterly	Councils
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major breaches; annual audit	Audit	PS	G; E
Disaster readiness milestones	Governance	% readiness actions completed before cyclone season; target 100%	Readiness plan	Annual	PS

3.31 Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Outage frequency and duration	Outcome	SAIFI/SAIDI (or equivalent) for electricity; target improve	Utility data	Quarterly	PS + utilities
Water continuity	Outcome	% population with continuous supply (where measured); target improve	Water utility	Quarterly	PS
Cost recovery discipline	Efficiency	Collection rate and losses reduction (where applicable)	Utility finance	Quarterly	PS
Project delivery timeliness	Output	% capital projects hitting milestones; target ≥ 85%	Project PMO	Quarterly	PS
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major breaches; annual audit	Audit	PS	G; E
Climate resilience actions	Governance	% resilience measures implemented vs plan	Programme tracking	Annual	PS

3.32 Ministry of Environment, Solid Waste Management and Climate Change

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Inspections and enforcement	Output	% planned inspections completed; target ≥ 95%	Inspectorate logs	Quarterly	PS
Compliance rate	Outcome	% inspected entities compliant; target improve	Inspection results	Quarterly	Inspectorate
Permit processing time	Efficiency	Median days for environmental permits; target reduction	Case system	Quarterly	Permitting head
Waste diversion rate	Outcome	% waste diverted from landfill (where measured); target improve	Waste stats	Annual	PS
Transparency of decisions	Governance	Publication of permit decisions and rationale within timeframe; target ≥ 95%	Website logs	Quarterly	PS
Audit findings closure	Governance	Closure within 90 days; ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS

3.33 Ministry of National Infrastructure and Community Development

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Project milestone adherence	Outcome	% projects meeting quarterly milestones; target ≥ 85%	PMO dashboards	Quarterly	PS
Unit cost control	Efficiency	Unit costs vs benchmark for standard works; target within band	QS data	Quarterly	Chief Engineer
Maintenance backlog	Outcome	Backlog value/volume vs plan; target reduction	Asset registry	Quarterly	PS
Procurement cycle time	Efficiency	Median days tender-to-award for standard categories; target reduce	e-Procurement	Quarterly	Procurement
Safety compliance	Governance	% sites compliant with safety checks; target ≥ 95%	Inspections	Quarterly	PS
Variation orders	Governance	% contracts with major variations; target reduction	Contract mgmt	Quarterly	PS

3.34 Ministry of Housing and Land Use Planning

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Permit/clearance turnaround	Efficiency	Median days for planning permissions; target reduction	Case system	Quarterly	PS
Housing delivery	Output	# units delivered vs plan (by programme)	Programme reports	Quarterly	PS
Targeting effectiveness	Outcome	% allocations meeting eligibility and priority criteria; target ≥ 98%	Audit sampling	Quarterly	Programme head
Cost per unit	Efficiency	Total programme cost per completed unit; target within band	Finance + QS	Annual	Finance head
Appeals resolution time	Efficiency	Median days to resolve appeals; target within SLA	Appeals log	Quarterly	PS
Procurement and integrity compliance	Governance	Audit closure within 90 days; ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS

3.35 Ministry of Land Transport and Light Rail

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Public transport punctuality	Outcome	% services on time (where measured); target improve	Operator data	Quarterly	PS
Road safety indicators	Outcome	Fatalities/serious injuries trend (with multi-agency caveats); target improve	Police + transport stats	Quarterly	PS
Licensing turnaround	Efficiency	Median days for key licences/permits; target reduce	Case system	Monthly	Service head
Cost per km maintained	Efficiency	Maintenance cost per km vs benchmark; target within band	Finance	Annual	PS
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major breaches; annual	Audit	PS	G; E
Overtime intensity	Efficiency	Overtime as % wage bill in operational units; target controlled	Payroll	Quarterly	HR

3.36 National Land Transport Authority

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Licence processing time	Efficiency	Median days to process licences; target reduction	NLTA system	Monthly	CEO
Compliance inspections	Output	# inspections vs plan; target ≥ 95%	Inspection logs	Quarterly	Ops head
Enforcement outcomes	Outcome	% non-compliance cases resolved within 30 days	Case tracker	Quarterly	Enforcement head
Digital share	Efficiency	% services online end-to-end; target increase	Portal analytics	Quarterly	ICT
Revenue leakage control	Governance	Audit exceptions in fee collection; target reduction	Audit	Annual	Finance head
Customer complaint resolution	Efficiency	Median days to resolve complaints; target within SLA	Complaints log	Quarterly	CEO

3.37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Treaty/negotiation deliverables	Output	% planned deliverables achieved (with quality review)	Directorate plans	Annual	PS
Consular service turnaround	Efficiency	Median days for key consular actions; target reduction	Consular logs	Quarterly	Service head
Trade facilitation interventions	Outcome	# resolved trade barriers with evidence of impact	Trade unit	Quarterly	PS
Cost discipline	Efficiency	Cost per consular case (pilot); target stable/reducing	Finance	Annual	Finance head
Publication transparency	Governance	Timely publication of key notices and fees	Website logs	Annual	PS
Audit findings closure	Governance	Closure within 90 days; ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS

3.38 Ministry of Tourism

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Licensing and approvals time	Efficiency	Median days for tourism licences (where applicable); target reduction	Case system	Quarterly	PS
Industry compliance	Outcome	% inspected entities compliant	Inspection	Quarterly	Inspectorate
Visitor satisfaction proxies	Outcome	Satisfaction index (survey/complaints); target improve	Surveys	Annual	PS
Marketing spend effectiveness	Efficiency	Spend per incremental outcome proxy; target improve with transparency	Programme eval	Annual	PS
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major breaches; annual	Audit	PS	G; E
Project delivery	Output	% tourism infrastructure projects on schedule	PMO	Quarterly	PS

3.39 Ministry of Financial Services and Good Governance

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Regulatory processing time	Efficiency	Median days for key approvals; target reduction	Regulator logs	Quarterly	PS
Compliance effectiveness	Outcome	% high-risk cases actioned within timeline	Risk system	Quarterly	PS
Transparency commitments	Governance	Publication timeliness of reports and registers as required	Publication log	Annual	PS
Cost-to-serve	Efficiency	Cost per regulatory case (pilot); target stable/reducing	Finance	Annual	Finance head
Audit closure	Governance	Closure within 90 days; ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS
Digital service adoption	Outcome	% customers using digital channels; target increase	Analytics	Quarterly	ICT

3.40 Ministry of Industrial Development, SMEs and Cooperatives

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
SME support turnaround	Efficiency	Median days from application to support decision	Programme MIS	Quarterly	PS
Survival/growth of supported SMEs	Outcome	% supported SMEs still active after 24 months (proxy); target improve	Follow-up data	Annual	Programme head
Cost per supported firm	Efficiency	Total spend / firms supported (by instrument)	Finance + MIS	Annual	Finance head
Digital application share	Output	% applications end-to-end digital; target increase	Portal logs	Quarterly	ICT
Integrity of grants/loans	Governance	% files complete and verified; target ≥ 95%	File audits	Quarterly	PS
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major breaches; annual	Audit	PS	G; E

3.41 Ministry of Commerce and Consumer Protection

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Inspection coverage	Output	% planned inspections completed; target ≥ 95%	Inspectorate	Quarterly	PS
Price/consumer complaint resolution	Outcome	Median days to resolve complaints; target within SLA	Complaints system	Quarterly	Service head
Compliance rate	Outcome	% inspected entities compliant; target improve	Inspection outcomes	Quarterly	Inspectorate
Permit/licence turnaround	Efficiency	Median days for key licences; target reduce	Case system	Quarterly	PS
Enforcement integrity	Governance	% cases with complete evidence pack; target ≥ 98%	Case audits	Annual	PS
Audit findings closure	Governance	Closure within 90 days; ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS

3.42 Ministry of Agro-Industry and Food Security

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Inspection and certification throughput	Output	% planned inspections/certifications delivered	Logs	Quarterly	PS
Biosecurity incident response	Outcome	Median time to respond to priority biosecurity events	Incident log	Quarterly	Service head
Irrigation and support service turnaround	Efficiency	Median days for key service requests	MIS	Quarterly	PS
Cost discipline	Efficiency	Unit cost per inspection/certification	Finance	Annual	Finance head
Digital advisory reach	Output	% farmers reached through digital channels (where applicable)	Analytics	Annual	ICT
Audit and procurement compliance	Governance	Closure within 90 days; ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS

3.43 Ministry of Blue Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Licensing turnaround	Efficiency	Median days for key licences/permits; target reduce	Case system	Quarterly	PS
Inspection and enforcement	Output	% planned inspections completed; target ≥ 95%	Logs	Quarterly	Inspectorate
Compliance outcomes	Outcome	% inspected entities compliant; target improve	Inspection outcomes	Quarterly	PS
Port/sector facilitation milestones	Outcome	% facilitation actions delivered to schedule	Programme tracker	Quarterly	PS
Cost per service unit	Efficiency	Unit cost per licence/inspection (pilot)	Finance + MIS	Annual	Finance head
Governance and audit closure	Governance	Closure within 90 days; ≥ 90%	Audit	Quarterly	PS

3.44 Irrigation Authority

KPI	Type	Definition and enforceable target	Data and frequency	Owner	Link
Service reliability	Outcome	% uptime/availability of schemes; target improve	Ops logs	Quarterly	CEO
Maintenance backlog	Efficiency	Backlog volume/value vs plan; target reduction	Asset registry	Quarterly	Ops head
Water loss control	Outcome	Losses/leakage proxy where measured; target improve	Measurements	Annual	CEO
Cost per hectare served	Efficiency	Operating cost / hectares served	Finance + ops	Annual	Finance head
Procurement compliance	Governance	0 major breaches; annual	Audit	CEO	G; E
Safety and environmental compliance	Governance	% compliance checks passed; target ≥ 95%	Inspections	Annual	CEO

4. Cross-cutting Compact dashboard

In addition to departmental KPIs, Cabinet requires a small set of indicators to monitor whether the PRB decision is staying inside a credible fiscal and delivery envelope. The anchor report proposes quarterly publication of indicators such as:

- compensation of employees as a share of GDP, recurrent expenditure, and revenue;

- wage bill growth relative to nominal GDP growth;

- deviation of borrowing requirement and primary balance from published medium-term path;

- maturity structure and rollover risk of domestic debt; and

- delivery "drift" indicators: median turnaround times and backlogs in high-volume services.

These are standard sustainability lenses used in international practice and are explicitly consistent with World Bank wage-bill sustainability framing. [World Bank PFR Fundamentals: Public Wage Bill Analysis, June 2025].

5. Implementation roadmap aligned to PRB phasing

A pragmatic sequencing, consistent with the PRB-Plus implementation plan set out in the anchor report, is as follows:

- **Q1 2026:** Cabinet approval of KPI framework; publication of KPI definitions; selection of pilot departments; appointment of KPI owners; data-lineage mapping.

- **Q2 2026:** Baseline capture; first internal dashboards; allowances and overtime diagnostic begins in pilot ministries.

- **Q3 2026:** First published Compact dashboard; first round of Service Recovery Plans for Red KPIs; targeted process redesign and digitisation in the highest-volume services.

- **Q4 2026:** Performance audits and data assurance checks; expansion to remaining departments; draft "Implementation and Delivery Statement".

- **January 2027:** Publication of the Implementation and Delivery Statement; integration of KPI results into budget and establishment planning; readiness assessment for phase-two PRB implementation.

This sequence is explicitly timed to the phasing decision: the State's credibility problem is not whether it can pay 50 per cent; it is whether it can demonstrate, by 2027, that the second 50 per cent is buying a more productive State rather than merely a larger wage base.

The Productivity–Fiscal Compact as an operating model

According to a document from late December 2025, the decisive question for PRB 2026 is no longer whether Government can *announce* the settlement, but whether the State can *absorb* it without quietly trading away fiscal resilience and delivery credibility over the following decade. In Mauritius, that trade is rarely negotiated explicitly; it is simply allowed to emerge, year after year, as the residual. This section makes the bargain explicit, and translates it into a set of operating disciplines that the sector-by-sector performance framework will later inherit.

1.1 What Cabinet decided — and why "phasing" is a timer, not a solution

Cabinet's record is unusually direct. The PRB recommendations, inclusive of salary compensation payable from 1 January 2026 and the integration of the interim allowance, were estimated to cost Government around **Rs 10.9 billion yearly**; and, given "the challenging current economic and fiscal context", Cabinet decided on **two-phase implementation: 50% from January 2026 and 100% from January 2027** *[Prime Minister's Office, Highlights of Cabinet Meeting, 19 December 2025].*

The institutional consequence is easy to miss if one treats phasing as thrift. It is not thrift; it is calendar management. The implementation is set in **January** effective dates, while the fiscal year runs **July–June**,

creating a stepped fiscal exposure profile. Converting the decision mechanically into fiscal years yields an indicative budget-year shape of **~25% of the annualised cost in FY2025/26, ~75% in FY2026/27**, and **100% from FY2027/28** onwards *[Bramston IQ, STI-TRG0001]*.

As illustrated below, the steepest ramp occurs in the transition year. That is precisely when institutional discipline is most needed—because it is also when governments are most tempted to treat the second half of the award as "tomorrow's problem", even though tomorrow arrives on schedule.

What phasing *does not* do is reduce the permanent baseline. Once integrated into the salary structure, remuneration becomes the reference point for increments, future negotiations, and (where relevant) pension-linked liabilities; phasing "slows the ratchet", but it does not remove it *[Bramston IQ, STI-TRG0001]*.

"Partial implementation may defeat the internal spirit of its package."
[PRB Report 2026, Vol. 1 — Introduction]

The implication for this performance framework is straightforward and slightly uncomfortable: the State has a single genuinely useful window—the twelve months between the first and second phase—to build enough delivery and performance credibility that the second phase lands in a system that has started to earn it.

Figure 1 PRB Phasing

1.2 The constraint envelope Mauritius is actually operating within

The IMF's 2025 Article IV assessment is not a moral lecture; it is the closest thing Mauritius has to an externally consistent constraint set. The IMF press release notes resilience (including **4.7% growth in 2024**) but argues that Mauritius needs to "recalibrate" the macro mix and pursue "frontloaded growth-friendly consolidation" to rebuild fiscal space *[IMF, Mauritius: 2025 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; and Staff Report, June 2025]*. (IMF)

The fiscal arithmetic that sits behind that language is the important part. In the consolidated fiscal envelope reproduced from **IMF Country Report No. 25/136**, public sector debt remains above the statutory ceiling across the period, rising to around **88–89% of GDP** in FY2024/25–FY2025/26 before declining only gradually to **~82.7%** by FY2030/31 *[IMF Country Report No. 25/136]*.

As illustrated below, the debt path is not a cliff-edge story; it is a *slow-bleed* story—precisely the sort of trajectory that allows complacency to set in until a refinancing episode forces realism.

The wage-bill anchor problem is embedded in the same table. Compensation of employees sits around **6% of GDP** across the second half of the decade in the IMF baseline *[IMF Country Report No. 25/136]*.

This is where PRB 2026 becomes a governance test rather than a wage debate. The IMF attributes part of the widening pressure in the near-term to compensation and transfers; PRB awards do not land in a neutral space, they land exactly where fiscal consolidation is meant to occur *[IMF Country Report No. 25/136; IMF Executive Board communication, June 2025]*.

A further complication—often ignored because it is less theatrical than the headline debt ratio—is *financing structure*. Government's own macro-fiscal framework acknowledges that the share of short-term domestic debt was expected to rise to about **20% in June 2025**, and sets an explicit target to reduce it to **below 10% by June 2028**, partly via maturity-lengthening and switching operations *[Budget 2025–2026: Medium Term Macroeconomic Framework, Fiscal Strategy and Debt Management Strategy]*.

That single page is effectively a behavioural warning: if refinancing risk is rising, the State's tolerance for policy slippage falls. Wage-bill drift is then not just a fiscal issue; it becomes a rollover and credibility issue.

Figure 2 Debt Path

Figure 3 Compensation GDP

1.3 Why "productivity" must be defined (and measured) before it is demanded

The term "productivity" is routinely used in public debate as a synonym for "effort". The PRB, to its credit, pushes towards a more adult definition: productivity is the relationship between outputs and inputs, and in public services quality is not decorative—it is constitutive *[OECD, Measuring Productivity; ONS, A guide to quality adjustment..., 2019]*. ([Office for National Statistics](#))

In the civil service, inputs are countable (headcount, grade, payroll; occasionally time). Outputs are countable but politically sensitive (licences processed, cases disposed, inspections completed). Quality is the true difficulty (correct decisions, lawful process, fair treatment, reduced leakage, durable outcomes). If quality is absent, the system tends to regress towards what bureaucracies are best at producing: proof that procedures were followed. Citizens are rarely grateful for proof.

The STI-TRG0001 critique captures the common failure mode with unusual candour: the first wave of performance management produces indicator proliferation and "a sudden rise in the quality of formatting"; the second wave—where a small number of measures are published and leaders accept judgement—is where seriousness begins.

This is not an argument against KPIs. It is an argument for *selectivity* and *consequence*. The sector-by-sector matrices that follow will therefore be built on four disciplines:

1. **Outputs must be defined in service terms**, not internal process terms.

2. **Outcomes must be few**, and tied to citizen/business/state results rather than departmental activity.

3. **Efficiency must be observable** (time, cost, error rate, backlog, leakage).

4. **Governance must be auditable**, not performative (compliance, transparency, control effectiveness).

This is also where international wage-bill analytics are quietly useful. World Bank guidance treats wage-bill sustainability through ratios that can be monitored without heroic data: wage bill as a share of GDP, revenue, and expenditure; and wage-bill growth relative to nominal GDP growth *[World Bank, PFR Fundamentals: Public Wage Bill Analysis, June 2025]*. ([World Bank](#))

1.4 What PRB is actually proposing: an operating system, not a bonus scheme

It is a mistake to treat PRB as merely a pay table. PRB 2026 sets out an unusually explicit performance architecture: an **Integrated Performance Management Framework (IPMF)** designed to integrate **Performance-Based Budgeting (PBB)** with the Performance Management System, cascading programme outcomes into organisational and individual objectives to ensure accountability "down the line" *[PRB Report 2026, Vol. 1 — Results-Oriented Performance Management System and PRIS]*. ([prb2026.govmu.org](#))

The PRB recommendation is operational in its institutional allocation of responsibility: system leadership and monitoring sits with **MPSAR**, integration with budgeting sits with the **Ministry of Finance**, and performance audit use sits with the **National Audit Office** *[PRB Report 2026, Vol. 1]*.

This triad matters because it avoids the classic failure where performance management becomes "an HR thing" and therefore loses authority. If finance and audit are structurally involved, the KPIs become harder to ignore—particularly when they begin to intersect with budget preparation, audit programming, and ultimately reputational exposure.

PRB is also notably sceptical about performance pay as the first lever. It states that PRIS implementation is "riddled with difficulties" and notes that evidence on efficiency gains from performance pay is "inconclusive and ambiguous" *[PRB Report 2026, Vol. 1]*.

> *"Empirical evidence on the efficiency gains from performance pay is both inconclusive and ambiguous."*
> [PRB Report 2026, Vol. 1 — ROPMS and PRIS]

The practical direction is therefore not "bonuses everywhere", but the tighter, fiscally cleaner bargain: credible appraisal, credible progression, and credible consequences for underperformance (including withholding or deferring increments), with non-financial recognition used deliberately rather than as a consolation prize *[PRB Report 2026, Vol. 1]*.

Finally, PRB links seriousness to digitalisation—because analogue performance systems tend to become annual rituals. That is highly aligned with Government's broader digital ambition to build services around life events and simplify delivery journeys *[MITCI, Blueprint for Mauritius – A Bridge to the Future, 2025]*. ([Ministry of Information Technology](#))

1.5 The Compact dashboard: three early warnings Cabinet should see quarterly

For Cabinet, dashboards fail when they attempt to be encyclopaedias. The STI-TRG0001 recommendation is deliberately lean: the objective is to detect drift early, not to satisfy a reporting appetite. Three indicators discriminate between benign and adverse trajectories well before the debt ratio itself changes enough to alarm anyone: (i) **gross financing needs and the maturity structure of domestic debt**, (ii) **credibility of recurrent consolidation** (not one-off receipts), and (iii) **operational reality of IPMF/ROPMS**, meaning whether metrics have consequences or simply create process [Budget 2025–2026 macro-fiscal framework; IMF Country Report No. 25/136; PRB Pay Review 2026].

One should underline the behavioural insight sitting underneath this. Affordability and delivery are often treated as separate questions because they sit in different committees and different mental boxes. In practice, they are the same question with different time horizons; and the future has an irritating habit of arriving.

KPI design rules and measurement guardrails

Performance frameworks fail in government for two reasons that are rarely discussed openly. First, they confuse measurement with management, producing a large quantity of indicators that are technically "true" but operationally irrelevant. Second, they attach consequences too early, which encourages gaming before the underlying data, definitions, and controls are stable. PRB 2026, to its credit, sets out a direction of travel that is consistent with modern practice: move from activities and outputs towards results, and cascade organisational priorities into individual objectives "down the line". The institutional risk is not conceptual; it is implementation discipline. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*.

The guardrails in this section therefore do not attempt to make the civil service "more measurable" in the abstract. They are designed to make the Productivity–Fiscal Compact *enforceable without becoming performative*. They also reflect a small-state constraint that matters more than it ought to: Mauritius does not have the spare institutional bandwidth to run several parallel performance regimes. The system must be simple enough to be operated consistently, and strict enough to be trusted. *[IMF How-To Note 2025/004; PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*.

2.1 KPI architecture: the minimum viable seriousness standard

The sector-by-sector and department-by-department matrices that follow will implement PRB's logic (IPMF + ROPMS + PBB alignment) while explicitly avoiding the two pathologies PRB itself warns against: (a) a compliance-heavy annual ritual, and (b) a proliferation of indicators that generate theatre rather than improvement.

The practical rule is that every department will carry:

- **A small public-facing set** (3–6) of Cabinet-grade service KPIs (primarily outcomes and service quality), published quarterly.

- **A slightly larger internal set** (8–15) for operational management (outputs, efficiency, error/backlog, and governance), reported monthly.

- **A non-negotiable governance spine** (audit, procurement, HR discipline, complaint handling), because a performance system that cannot survive an audit is not a performance system; it is an opinion.

These are not stylistic choices. They are administrative survivability choices.

The non-negotiable: productivity must be defined in service terms

The Productivity–Fiscal Compact ultimately lives or dies on one definitional decision: whether outputs are expressed in terms that citizens and firms recognise as "the State", or in internal process language that only the State recognises as itself. International productivity measurement guidance is explicit that productivity is, at heart, an output–input relationship; the argument begins with what is counted as an output, and only then becomes a discussion about efficiency. *[OECD Productivity Manual 2001]*.

In practice, this means a licence issued, a benefit paid, a court decision delivered, an inspection completed, a procurement completed, a passport produced. It does not mean meetings held, memos drafted, or forms processed—unless those things are explicitly mapped to a service transaction. The behavioural reason is straightforward: if an organisation is rewarded for activity, it will become excellent at activity. Citizens are rarely grateful for it. *[OECD Productivity Manual 2001]*.

This service framing is also fiscally material. The World Bank's wage-bill guidance warns that wage growth that outpaces productivity can widen deficits and raise debt; the only sustainable counterweight is a State that becomes measurably more effective per rupee, not merely larger or better paid. *[World Bank PFR Fundamentals: Public Wage Bill Analysis, June 2025]*.

2.2 Measurement discipline: what to measure when data is imperfect

The UK ONS guidance on quality adjustment makes a point that is directly transferable to Mauritius: quality measurement is methodologically delicate and evolves

over time; where quality is hard to measure, the metric should be treated as a prompt for enquiry rather than a mechanically incentivised target *[ONS, 2019]*. (Office for National Statistics)

For the Mauritian civil service framework, this yields a pragmatic sequencing rule:

- **Phase 1 (first 12 months):** focus on timeliness, backlogs, error rates, and compliance—because the data is either already available or can be captured with minimal system change.

- **Phase 2 (months 12–24):** introduce quality adjustments where defensible (appeal overturn rates, rework rates, clinical readmission proxies, learning outcome improvements), and formalise citizen experience measures (complaints resolution time; satisfaction for high-volume services).

- **Phase 3 (24 months+):** link outcomes to resource allocation under PBB more tightly, and harden the "consequence layer" (progression, eligibility for higher duties, targeted capability interventions).

This is also why Government's digital strategy matters: life-event digital services are not merely convenience;

they are measurement infrastructure. If transactions are digital, timeliness, touchpoints, and error correction become visible without launching a survey expedition *[MITCI, Blueprint for Mauritius, 2025]*. (Ministry of Information Technology)

A balanced KPI set: outputs, outcomes, efficiency, governance

A KPI regime that is dominated by any single category will be gamed. Output-heavy regimes invite throughput without correctness. Outcome-heavy regimes invite attribution disputes and polite, unresolvable arguments about causality. Efficiency-only regimes encourage risk-avoidance and "easy cases first". Governance-only regimes lead back to compliance theatre.

The Compact therefore requires a *fourfold minimum set* for each ministry and department: **outputs, outcomes, efficiency, and governance**. The intent is not symmetry for its own sake; it is balance as an anti-gaming device.

OUTPUT KPIs

What the department produces
(volumes, cases, inspections,
licences, decisions)

OUTCOME KPIs

What changes for citizens,
businesses and the State
(compliance, safety, trust,
health/learning outcomes)

Design rule: balance all four categories
(or the system will be gamed)

EFFICIENCY KPIs

How well resources are used
(time, backlog, unit cost,
error/rework rate, digital share)

GOVERNANCE KPIs

Control effectiveness
(compliance, audit closure,
transparency, procurement,
integrity cases)

Figure 4 KPI Taxonomy Quadrant

The design rule is simple: every published departmental KPI set must include at least one measure in each quadrant, and no single quadrant should dominate the narrative. Where a department argues that one quadrant is not applicable, the burden of proof sits with the department, not the centre. This is not pedantry; it is how gaming is prevented in systems where operational discretion is high.

2.3 Publish few, manage more, audit everything

PRB's proposed operating system—a results-oriented framework integrating performance-based budgeting with performance management—implicitly requires a disciplined separation between what is managed internally and what is made public. PRB also allocates responsibilities across MPSAR, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Audit Office in a way that recognises a common failure mode: performance management becoming "an HR thing", and therefore

losing authority. The design below makes that triad operational. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*.

The correct model is **layered**:

- a small public dashboard that anchors accountability;
- a richer internal pack that allows managers to run the service;
- an assurance layer that makes the numbers contestable and credible.

Figure 5 KPI Layering Model

The public layer should be intentionally boring: three to six KPIs per department, published quarterly, stable across the year, with definitions frozen for at least twelve months. The internal layer can—and should—be more detailed, updated monthly, and used for operational interventions. The assurance layer is where most reforms quietly die, because it is the unglamorous work of reconciling counts, checking denominators, and producing audit trails.

The discipline here is reputational as much as technical. A dashboard that is published but has no institutional consequences becomes decorative. A dashboard that drives careers too mechanically produces better numbers and worse services. The middle path is to publish, audit, and use escalation and support rather than league tables. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*.

2.4 Quality adjustment: when not to reward speed

Public services are not factories. Historically, national accounts treated public output as equal to input, which implies productivity growth is always zero—an accounting convenience with a grim policy implication. Modern practice attempts to measure output directly and adjust for quality where feasible. The ONS definition is useful precisely because it is cautious: quality adjustment is a statistical estimate of changes in service quality, and attributability remains a core methodological challenge. [ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019].

For Mauritius, the operational implication is not to pretend quality can always be measured cleanly. It is to impose a rule about what can be rewarded:

Rule 1: no KPI may be mechanically incentivised unless quality is either directly measured or credibly proxied.

Where quality is hard to quantify, the metric should be treated as a prompt for enquiry rather than a target attached to pay. This is not philosophical; it is a practical defence against perverse incentives. The ONS itself frames quality measurement as continuous methodological work, not a one-off tick-box exercise. [ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019].

In departmental terms, this creates a consistent approach to "quality proxies" that will recur throughout the sector KPI matrices:

- **First-time-right rate** (share of cases completed without rework or return for missing information) is preferred to raw volume, because it captures correctness and process design in one measure.

- **Appeal uphold / overturn rates** are a defensible proxy for decision quality in adjudicative or enforcement bodies.

- **Audit exceptions and reconciliation breaks** are quality proxies for financial processing and benefit administration.

- **Complaint resolution time**, paired with substantiation rates, provides an imperfect but workable proxy for citizen-experienced service quality.

PRB's own text implies precisely this logic in its proposed Covenant metrics: turnaround times and

backlogs are useful, but where quality matters more than speed—justice, enforcement, complex assessments—quality proxies should be explicit. [PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1].

2.5 Anti-gaming guardrails: baskets, counter-metrics, and "difficult cases"

If a KPI regime is designed without an explicit theory of gaming, it will acquire one in practice. PRB's own diagnosis of performance-related incentives is unusually candid, noting that empirical evidence on efficiency gains from performance pay is "inconclusive and ambiguous", and listing distortions that are behavioural rather than ideological: short-termism, undervaluing collaboration, and an overemphasis on monetary incentives. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1].*

The framework therefore adopts two hard guardrails, both already foreshadowed in STI-TRG0001:

Guardrail A: no single metric determines success.

A basket prevents gaming.

Guardrail B: every metric has a counter-metric.

If turnaround time is emphasised, error rate must be watched. If enforcement volume rises, appeal uphold and legal reversal rates must be watched. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1].*

These guardrails are not merely about preventing fraud. They protect the State against a subtler failure: risk-avoidance. In many services, the easiest way to improve a headline number is to stop doing the difficult cases. That might improve the dashboard. It will not improve the country. *[ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019].*

2.6 Escalation design: consequences without blunt incentives

There must be an escalation mechanism, because without escalation the dashboard becomes theatre. But escalation should trigger *management action and institutional support*, not immediate financial rewards or punishments attached to a single metric. The behavioural logic is to keep the early system honest: departments should not be incentivised to improve the appearance of performance faster than they improve performance itself.

| GREEN On track | AMBER Watchlist | RED Service recovery plan |

Escalation rule (Compact-critical KPIs)
2 consecutive quarters RED → Service Recovery Plan
3 quarters RED → rules/resources review + Cabinet note

Quality adjustment
(rework, overturns, readmissions)

Counter-metrics
(time + error + backlog together)

Auditability
(sample checks, lineage, logs)

Anti-gaming principle: never reward volume without verifying quality and control.

For Compact-critical KPIs (the small set of published service standards that define the citizen experience of the State), the minimum viable escalation ladder is:

■ **Two consecutive quarters in "red"** triggers a formal **Service Recovery Plan**, signed by the Permanent Secretary (or agency head), with a defined intervention package (process redesign, redeployment, digital support, procurement fix, or regulatory simplification).

■ **Three consecutive quarters in "red"** triggers a **rules–resources review**, and a short Cabinet note that forces an explicit choice: change the process/rules, change the resourcing, or accept the performance and explain it.

The important element is that escalation is *predictable*. The system should not rely on occasional bursts of political attention. Those arrive too late, and usually in the wrong mood.

2.7 Measurement maturity: phasing that is real, not rhetorical

The most dangerous sentence in performance reform is "we will measure outcomes". It is also the most popular, because it sounds sophisticated. Outcomes matter, but they tend to mature slowly and are often influenced by variables outside a department's control. The practical solution is a maturity pathway: begin with timeliness and volume where data exists; harden quality; only then attach incentives or progression gates.

Figure 6 Measurement Maturity Roadmap

This sequencing also fits the PRB implementation reality. STI-TRG0001 emphasises that Mauritius has a narrow window between the first and second phase of PRB implementation in which to establish credible performance machinery. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*.

A pragmatic maturity model for ministries and departments is therefore:

- **Phase 1 (2026):** focus on timeliness, backlogs, error/rework, digital share, and basic compliance indicators. Build definitional discipline and baseline credibility.
- **Phase 2 (2027):** introduce quality proxies and audit-anchored checks (appeal outcomes, exception rates, complaint substantiation).
- **Phase 3 (2028 onward):** add outcomes and budget/progression linkages where attribution is defensible, and where data lineage is stable enough to withstand scrutiny.

This avoids the common mistake of attaching consequences to immature metrics. It also avoids the equally common mistake of endless pilots that never graduate into accountability.

2.8 Data lineage, auditability, and the "contestability" test

A KPI is only useful if it is contestable. "Contestable" does not mean politically arguable; it means the calculation can be traced, replicated, and sampled. PRB's proposed architecture implicitly recognises this by distributing responsibility across MPSAR (system leadership), the Ministry of Finance (budget linkage), and the National Audit Office (performance audits on efficiency and effectiveness). [PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1].

This creates a practical design constraint: **every published KPI must have a data lineage statement** attached to it, even if that statement is not public in full. The lineage statement should identify the source system/register, extraction date, coverage boundaries, denominator definition, and reconciliation method. Where systems are not yet digital, the lineage statement should specify the sampling method and the manual register used. The logic is illustrated below.

Figure 7 Data Lineage Assurance Map

Digitalisation matters here, not as a procurement project, but as a seriousness device. PRB itself links digitalisation to real-time monitoring and evidence-based decisions, noting that non-digital performance systems easily become annual rituals. A digital system does not guarantee discipline, but an analogue one almost guarantees ritual. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*.

2.9 Linking KPIs to progression and rewards: start with career gates, not bonus schemes

Because PRB is sceptical about variable pay efficacy, the framework does not begin with performance bonuses. It begins with a quieter, more credible linkage: **progression gates and assignment eligibility**, supported by a system that can manage underperformance. PRB's own recommended interim approach is consistent with this: reward high performers through non-financial incentives; continue annual increments based on performance assessment; allow increments to be withheld, stopped, or deferred in underperformance cases; and use performance ratings to determine eligibility for assignment of higher duties rather than relying solely on seniority. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*. In Compact terms, this establishes a cleaner bargain. **The State is not asking professionals to chase targets for a bonus; it is asking leaders to run services competently**, and it is offering a progression system that recognises competence and addresses sustained underperformance. That is both more fiscally honest and more aligned with public service professionalism than pseudo-market pay schemes in a small administration. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*.

Minimum viable specification to apply across all sectors and departments

To prevent departmental KPI matrices degenerating into bespoke art projects, the following parameters apply uniformly across the civil service:
1. **Each department publishes 3–6 Compact-critical KPIs quarterly**, balanced across output, outcome, efficiency, and governance categories. Definitions are frozen for twelve months.
2. **Each department maintains an internal monthly pack (8–15 KPIs)** used for operational management and intervention, including backlog, error, and throughput decomposition.
3. **Every published KPI has an internal data lineage statement** and is subject to sampling and reconciliation. If a KPI cannot be traced, it cannot be used for incentives.
4. **Targets are set on medians and distributions, not averages**, and are paired with a counter-metric to prevent perverse incentives.
5. **Escalation is automatic and predictable** for Compact-critical KPIs: two quarters red triggers a recovery plan; three triggers a rules–resources review.
6. **Consequences attach first to career gates and institutional reviews**, not to cash bonuses; performance pay is considered only after measurement maturity is proven and audited.

These rules create the operating discipline required for the sector-by-sector KPI matrices that follow. They also align directly with PRB's intent: integrate performance-based budgeting with results-oriented performance management, with clear metrics, credible accountability, and a digital backbone capable of real-time monitoring. *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1; ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019; OECD Productivity Manual 2001]*.

Governance and accountability architecture

The Compact will succeed or fail on an unglamorous point: whether accountability is engineered into routine administration rather than left to bursts of ministerial attention. In most governments, performance failure is less often the product of malice than of diffusion. Where everyone is notionally responsible, no-one is operationally accountable. The point of this section is therefore not to invent new committees for their own sake, but to specify a minimal governance spine that (i) protects fiscal anchors, (ii) enforces service standards, (iii) produces auditable evidence, and (iv) creates an escalation mechanism that does not require a crisis to operate.

The architecture proposed below aligns with PRB 2026's intent to integrate a results-oriented performance management system with performance-based budgeting and reporting, while recognising PRB's own caution about simplistic performance-pay schemes and immature metrics *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1; ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019; OECD Productivity Manual 2001]*.

3.1 Design principles for Compact governance

The governance model rests on five principles which are intentionally stricter than "good practice", because PRB implementation is rarely undermined by ideology; it is undermined by overload.

⊕ First, one KPI must have one accountable owner.

Shared ownership may be collegial, but it is not enforceable. Accountability should sit with a named Accounting Officer (Permanent Secretary / agency head), with an operational owner beneath them responsible for delivery.

⊕ Second, the system must separate management from publication.

A small set of published measures anchors accountability; a richer internal pack allows operational control; an assurance layer makes the numbers contestable. This is not a communications decision. It is an anti-gaming decision *[ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019]*.

⊕ Third, escalation must be predictable and procedural.

The point is to avoid a culture where performance is ignored until it becomes embarrassing, at which point it is treated as an emergency and managed emotionally.

⊕ Fourth, fiscal and performance governance must be integrated.

If budgeting and performance management operate as parallel worlds, the wage bill becomes a permanent claim while delivery becomes an annual narrative *[World Bank PFR Fundamentals: Public Wage Bill Analysis, June 2025]*.

⊕ Fifth, the system must be survivable within existing capacity.

A small administration can run a high-discipline regime, but it cannot run a sprawling one.

3.2 Institutional accountability map

The architecture is built around a small number of bodies with clear responsibilities, avoiding "committee multiplication". The model uses existing institutional roles (Cabinet, Accounting Officers, Ministry of Finance, MPSAIR, Internal Audit, NAO, Parliament) and formalises their interaction under the Compact.

Figure below is the intended operating model. It clarifies accountability routes and the assurance feedback loop.

Governance operating model for the Productivity-Fiscal Compact

Cabinet Committee on Productivity–Fiscal Compact (Quarterly)
• approves anchors and targets • reviews Red KPIs • mandates recovery plans

MoF
Budget + Treasury
(anchors, PBB, wage-bill control)

Compact Secretariat (Monthly)
MoF (fiscal anchors) + MPSAIR (IPMF/ROPMS)
• consolidates dashboards • validates definitions • escalates exceptions

MPSAIR
Performance system owner
(IPMF, HR policy, delivery support)

Ministry Performance Board (Monthly)
PS/Accounting Officer + CFO + HR + ICT + Service Heads
• reviews operational pack • resolves bottlenecks • signs data attestation

Departments & Agencies (Weekly/Monthly)
Operational owners deliver services; Data owners produce KPIs;

Internal Audit / QA
Sampling, reconciliation,
control tests

National Audit Office
Performance audits (periodic)
Value-for-money reviews

Parliamentary oversight
PAC follow-up; publication
and public scrutiny

Accountability principle: one owner per KPI, one data lineage, one assurance route, and one escalation path.

Figure 8 Governance operating model for the Productivity–Fiscal Compact

3.2.1 Cabinet Committee on the Productivity–Fiscal Compact

A Cabinet-level committee is required because the Compact is, by design, both fiscal and operational. Its responsibilities are to:
(i) approve and periodically reaffirm fiscal anchors and service standards;
(ii) review the quarterly Compact dashboard and the list of red indicators;
(iii) mandate Service Recovery Plans where thresholds are breached; and
(iv) resolve cross-ministerial blockers that cannot be settled at administrative level.

The Committee should be chaired by the Prime Minister or a senior minister designated to arbitrate between fiscal discipline and service exigencies. The critical point is not the title; it is that escalation has a predictable political endpoint.

3.2.2 Compact Secretariat

The Secretariat is the engine room and must be small, technically credible, and jointly owned. In practice, joint ownership means:

- **Ministry of Finance:** fiscal anchors, wage-bill monitoring, PBB integration, and expenditure controls;

- **MPSAIR:** performance architecture (IPMF/ROPMS), HR policy alignment, and delivery support.

Its mandate is not to "run ministries", but to:
(i) define KPI standards and approve KPI dictionaries;
(ii) consolidate dashboards and validate definitions;
(iii) flag data integrity issues and commission assurance sampling;
(iv) prepare Cabinet submissions for escalation cases; and
(v) publish a quarterly public summary.

This reflects PRB's proposed institutional allocation of responsibility in which system leadership sits with MPSAIR, budget linkage sits with Finance, and performance audit sits with the National Audit Office *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*.

3.2.3 Ministry Performance Boards

Each ministry should operate a monthly Performance Board chaired by the Accounting Officer and supported by the CFO, HR lead, ICT lead, and service-line heads. This is the forum that makes the internal performance pack operational: resolving bottlenecks, reassigning resources, addressing recruitment constraints, and signing a monthly KPI attestation.

This is also the level at which "quiet drift" is usually born (overtime creep, exceptions, workarounds). If drift is not visible to the Accounting Officer monthly, it will become visible to Cabinet annually, at which point it will be costly and political.

3.2.4 Departments and agencies

Departments remain the unit of delivery. The governance model assumes that operational managers are responsible for throughput and service standards, while data owners are responsible for KPI production and lineage. That separation is deliberate: it prevents the "numbers person" from being blamed for performance, and it prevents the "delivery person" from owning data that cannot be audited.

3.2.5 Assurance and oversight

Assurance is not an optional add-on; it is the difference between a KPI and a claim.

- **Internal audit / QA** performs routine sampling, reconciliations, and control tests, and reports exceptions to the Accounting Officer and the Secretariat.

- **National Audit Office** undertakes periodic performance audits and value-for-money reviews, selecting topics partly on the basis of persistent underperformance or systemic drift [PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1].

- **Parliamentary oversight** (notably PAC follow-up) provides the public accountability endpoint.

The key is that assurance must be risk-based and proportionate. If every KPI is audited exhaustively, nothing will be audited effectively.

3.3 KPI ownership and accountability structures

Every KPI in the departmental matrices must have four named roles. This is a non-negotiable governance standard because it is what makes escalation credible.

1. **Accountable Owner (A):** Accounting Officer (PS / DG / agency head).
   Accountable for results and for approving the monthly attestation that the KPI is materially correct.

2. **Operational Owner (O):** Head of service line. Responsible for delivery interventions and for explaining performance variance.

3. **Data Owner (D):** Head of MIS / statistics / registry.
   Responsible for definitions, extraction, calculation, and the data lineage statement.

4. **Assurance Owner (S):** Internal audit / QA lead (with NAO as periodic external assurance). Responsible for sampling, reconciliation, and reporting exceptions.

This A–O–D–S structure prevents the common failure where the "owner" is whoever is most comfortable with PowerPoint.

3.4 Data governance, lineage, and assurance protocols

The Compact cannot rely on faith-based statistics. It requires a minimum viable data governance regime that is administratively realistic.

3.4.1 KPI dictionary and definition freeze

The Secretariat should issue a Compact KPI dictionary with standard definitions, denominator rules, and measurement frequency. Definitions are frozen for 12 months unless Cabinet approves a change for clear methodological reasons. This prevents indicator shopping and retrospective redefinition.

3.4.2 Data lineage statements

Every published KPI must have an internal data lineage statement describing: source system/register, extraction method, coverage boundary, denominator definition, reconciliation method, and any manual fallbacks. Where digital systems lag, manual sampling is acceptable — but it must be specified.

Figure 8 shows the accountability flow; Figure 7 (from Section 3) shows the data lineage and assurance map. Together, they make KPIs contestable.

3.4.3 Quality adjustment and counter-metrics

Where speed is measured, quality must be proxied (error/rework rate, appeal overturn rate, audit exceptions, complaint substantiation). This aligns with international guidance that warns against naïve output metrics and treats quality adjustment as essential but methodologically cautious *[ONS Quality Adjustment Guide 2019; OECD Productivity Manual 2001]*.

3.5 Reporting cadence and escalation mechanisms

Governance is not only "who", but "how often". The cadence must match the pace at which drift becomes expensive.

Reporting cadence and decision points

Monthly (operational)
Ministry Performance Board reviews internal pack; fixes bottlenecks; approves reallocations

Quarterly (accountability)
Compact Secretariat publishes dashboard; Cabinet Committee reviews Reds and approves recovery plans

Annual (institutional review)
Delivery & Productivity Statement; budget hearings use KPI evidence; NAO selects audit topics

Escalation triggers (Compact-critical KPIs)
Amber → watchlist and support | 2 quarters Red → Service Recovery Plan | 3 quarters Red → rules/resources review + Cabinet note

Figure 9 Reporting cadence and decision points

3.5.1 Monthly: operational control

Each Ministry Performance Board reviews the internal pack monthly, approves immediate interventions (process fixes, redeployment, targeted recruitment requests, overtime controls), and signs KPI attestations.

3.5.2 Quarterly: accountability and publication

The Secretariat consolidates dashboards quarterly, validates definitions, and issues:
(i) a Cabinet dashboard; and
(ii) a published public summary.

Cabinet reviews red indicators and mandates Service Recovery Plans where thresholds are breached.

3.5.3 Annual: institutional performance review

Each ministry produces a Delivery & Productivity Statement reconciling: headcount, payroll, outputs, outcomes, and unit cost trends. Budget hearings use KPI evidence, and the NAO selects performance audit topics based on risk and persistent drift *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1; World Bank PFR Fundamentals: Public Wage Bill Analysis, June 2025]*.

3.5.4 Escalation rules

Escalation rules are procedural and automatic for Compact-critical KPIs:

- **Amber:** watchlist and delivery support (technical assistance, process redesign, digital support, procurement acceleration).
- **Two consecutive quarters Red:** formal Service Recovery Plan signed by Accounting Officer.
- **Three consecutive quarters Red:** rules–resources review and Cabinet note requiring an explicit

decision: simplify rules, change resources, or accept the performance and explain it.

This avoids both complacency and melodrama.

3.6 Linking governance to budgeting, remuneration, and careers

The Compact's credibility depends on consequences that are real but not crude.

3.6.1 Budget linkage

The Ministry of Finance integrates performance evidence into:

- programme budget reviews;
- establishment planning;
- recruitment approvals; and
- spend-to-save allocations for digital redesign.

This reflects the wage-bill sustainability logic common to international fiscal practice: wage bills become sustainable only when output per unit resource improves, or when the resource envelope is actively managed [World Bank PFR Fundamentals: Public Wage Bill Analysis, June 2025].

3.6.2 Career progression and increments (phased)

PRB guidance provides a practical, Mauritius-appropriate pathway: performance assessment informs annual increments; increments may be withheld or deferred in underperformance cases; and performance ratings influence eligibility for higher duties and assignments rather than relying solely on seniority [PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1].

The Compact therefore proposes a phased linkage:

- **2026:** linkage applies primarily to senior leadership appointments, higher-duties eligibility, and targeted capability support.
- **2027 onward:** once KPI maturity and assurance are credible, progression gates can be applied more broadly, with safeguards to prevent gaming.

This is a more disciplined approach than a broad performance-bonus regime, and it aligns with PRB's caution that evidence on performance pay efficiency gains is ambiguous [PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1].

3.7 Transparency and public accountability

Compact governance is strengthened by modest transparency rather than maximal exposure. The public summary should publish:

- headline KPIs and service standards;
- red indicators and recovery plan status;
- major definitional changes; and
- a short narrative on interventions.

The aim is reputational discipline, not public humiliation. A government cannot sensibly run a State as though it were a call centre leaderboard, but it can publish enough to make underperformance politically costly and improvement politically valuable.

3.8 Phased implementation and administrative realism

Because the Compact is being introduced alongside phased PRB implementation, the governance architecture itself should be phased:

- **Phase 1 (first two quarters):** establish Secretariat, publish KPI dictionary, pilot in high-volume departments, run assurance sampling.
- **Phase 2 (remainder of 2026):** expand coverage, publish first dashboards, run first recovery plans.
- **Phase 3 (2027):** harden quality proxies, integrate formally into budget and establishment planning, begin NAO performance audit cycle.

This sequencing avoids the usual trap: demanding consequence before measurement credibility exists.

3.9 A short operational risk register

A governance design that ignores risk is merely decorative. The Compact should track, at minimum:

- **Data integrity risk:** immature systems, denominator disputes, manual fallbacks. Mitigation: lineage statements, sampling, definition freeze.
- **Gaming risk:** speed over quality, easy-case selection. Mitigation: counter-metrics, quality proxies, basket targets.
- **Capacity risk:** overload of KPI production. Mitigation: layered system; few published KPIs; standard templates.
- **Political economy risk:** resistance where KPIs threaten entrenched discretion. Mitigation: phased consequences; visible fairness; early wins in high-volume services.
- **Fragmentation risk:** HR, finance, and delivery operating separately. Mitigation: joint Secretariat; integrated budget hearings; NAO performance audits.

Implementation roadmap 2026–2028

4.1 Purpose and operating logic

A roadmap is not a calendar; it is a commitment device. It exists to prevent the usual Mauritian (and, to be fair, global) pattern in which a reform is launched with great rhetorical energy and then quietly reclassified as "ongoing", which is bureaucratic shorthand for *non-falsifiable*. The Compact requires the opposite: a sequence of decisions and deliverables that are sufficiently concrete that failure is visible early enough to correct.

The sequencing is anchored to three realities.

First, Cabinet has recorded the PRB 2026 settlement as a **two-phase implementation—50% from January 2026 and 100% from January 2027**—with an annualised Government cost estimate of **around Rs 10.9 billion**, inclusive of the integration of the interim 5% allowance into salary *[PMO, Highlights of Cabinet Meeting, 19 December 2025]*.

Second, PRB itself implies an implementation discipline: organisational structure and conditions-of-service recommendations are indicated to be implemented within **up to 18 months** *[PRB Pay Review 2026, Vol. 1]*.

Third, the report's critique of performance reforms is practical rather than ideological: reforms fail when they are launched as if timing does not matter, and when they are pushed everywhere at once, resulting in "implementation nowhere with seriousness".

The roadmap therefore follows a single governing principle: **pilot for credibility, publish for accountability, harden before attaching consequences**. The State should not attempt to "incentivise" performance until it can measure performance in a way that survives audit, ministerial scrutiny, and, crucially, the ingenuity of the people being measured.

4.2 Roadmap overview: Build, Scale, Embed

The three-year roadmap is summarised in Figures below. Figure 5.1 shows the workstreams across quarters; Figure 5.2 provides a year-by-year ladder of the minimum viable deliverables.

The logic of the sequence is deliberately aligned to the phasing window: the second PRB phase (January 2027) should arrive into a system that has *begun to earn it* through visible, published service standards and fiscal anchors, not into an administrative fog of "work in progress".

Figure 10 Implementation Roadmap

2026 — BUILD CREDIBILITY	2027 — SCALE & PUBLISH	2028 — EMBED & HARDEN
• Cabinet approves Compact governance and anchors	• Publish Implementation & Delivery Statement (Jan)	• Quality proxies hardened; counter-metrics standard
• Secretariat stood up (MoF + MPSAIR)	• PRB phase-two lands into working machinery	• Unit-cost and productivity metrics broadened
• Covenant template + KPI dictionary published	• Expand Covenant coverage across ministries	• Progression gates for senior leadership
• Pilot high-volume services; baseline capture	• Quarterly Compact dashboard institutionalised	• Redeployment and mobility mechanisms used routinely
• First quarterly service dashboards released	• Budget hearings use KPI evidence (PBB link)	• Spend-to-save funding for process redesign
• Allowances/overtime diagnostic completed	• First NAO performance audits (risk-based)	• External review of KPI integrity and impact
• Initial sampling and reconciliation routines	• Recovery plans normalised for persistent Reds	• Compact reporting becomes 'business as usual'

Roadmap principle: pilot for credibility, publish for accountability, harden before attaching consequences.

Figure 11 Implementation Ladder 2026-2028

4.3 2026: Build credibility inside the phasing window

The report proposes a tight 12-month choreography (January 2026 to January 2027) that is not an optional flourish; it is the only period in which the State can credibly claim that the second phase is part of a productivity bargain rather than a political inevitability.

⊕ January–March 2026: Commit, standardise, and staff the centre

The first quarter is about institutional seriousness rather than departmental heroics. Cabinet approval is required for the "PRB-Plus" wrapper: a **Productivity Covenant template** (service standards + indicators + reporting schedule) and the establishment of a small central **delivery unit within MPSAR** (now MPSAIR), with the Ministry of Finance as co-owner to ensure alignment with performance-based budgeting—explicitly reflecting PRB's own institutional recommendations on the Integrated Performance Management Framework (IPMF).

Operationally, this quarter must deliver four tangible artefacts:
1. a Compact governance decision (Committee and Secretariat mandates, escalation rules);
2. a KPI dictionary (definitions, denominators, frequency, data lineage requirements);
3. the Covenant template (service standards and reporting format); and
4. a short list of pilot services and pilot departments selected for volume and friction (the services citizens and firms actually experience as "the State").

The behavioural reason for this early standardisation is banal but decisive: ambiguity is comfortable. It permits polite disagreement, which permits delay. A dictionary freezes the argument and moves the system into delivery.

⊕ April–June 2026: Pilot the Covenant and publish the first dashboards

The second quarter is where credibility begins. The report recommends piloting the Covenant and a **digital ROPMS** in a limited number of high-volume service areas (examples given include licensing/permits, benefits administration, and one regulatory function), and **publishing the first quarterly service performance dashboards**. It is explicit that piloting is not timidity; it is credibility—systems launched everywhere at once are often implemented nowhere with seriousness.

At the same time, the digital layer cannot be an afterthought. PRB links digitalisation to real-time monitoring and evidence-based decisions and warns that analogue performance systems become annual rituals. In other words: without digitisation, the performance framework will still exist, but mainly as paperwork with ambitions.

⊕ July–September 2026: Fix the hidden wage-bill—allowances and overtime

The third quarter addresses the part of the wage bill that frequently surprises Ministries of Finance: **allowances and overtime**. The roadmap proposes an allowances and overtime diagnostic across ministries—what exists, why it exists, who benefits, and what it costs—and the publication of the first wage-bill scoreboard against the anchor. The logic is simple: PRB conversion does not, by itself, simplify allowances; this is where drift hides in plain sight.

This quarter should also be used to make mobility operational in at least a limited form—redeploying staff from low-pressure to high-pressure functions—because the Compact's delivery goals will fail if capacity is treated as fixed and immovable. The report argues that mobility requires rules, not speeches (portability of grades where job content is comparable; managed mechanisms to redeploy without industrial-relations melodrama).

⊕ October–December 2026: Launch assurance, not just reporting

The fourth quarter turns performance reporting into something contestable. The report recommends using NAO and internal audit functions to begin performance audits that focus on delivery metrics (timeliness, error rates, backlogs) rather than procedural compliance alone, explicitly aligning with PRB's vision that ROPMS information should support performance audits on efficiency and effectiveness.

This is also the appropriate moment for Cabinet to see a **small monitoring dashboard** (quarterly) that integrates fiscal sustainability and delivery credibility, rather than an elaborate indicator catalogue. The report's proposed dashboard is intentionally lean: wage-bill ratios (including allowances/overtime), borrowing deviations, refinancing risk indicators, and service medians (turnaround, backlog, error/rework), with a specific caution that dashboards which are published without career consequence become decorative, while dashboards attached too mechanically to careers are promptly gamed.

4.4 January 2027: The "Implementation and Delivery Statement" as a seriousness test

Prior to implementing the second phase, the report recommends publishing a short **Implementation and Delivery Statement** to Parliament and the public: what was implemented, what changed in service standards, where performance improved, and where it did not. It is explicit that this is not conditionality theatre; it is "minimum viable accountability" that prevents the second phase becoming purely political inevitability.

This Statement should be short, sober, and measurable. Its value is not rhetorical; it forces an evidence-based narrative at the precise moment when the system is otherwise tempted to move on.

PRB's own warning—that partial or delayed implementation may defeat the spirit of the package— should be treated as implementation discipline. The system must remain coherent even when the cash profile is staged.

4.5 2027: Scale and publish— move from pilots to the civil service norm

If 2026 is about proving that measurement can be credible, 2027 is about turning that credibility into routine administration. The report defines "success by 2027" not as transforming the debt ratio by magic, but as making delivery legible: a Productivity Covenant in the public domain with a limited set of service standards published quarterly for high-volume services, measured and discussed without drama.

Practically, 2027 should deliver five structural shifts:

⊕ First, Covenant coverage expands beyond pilots.
Each ministry should publish a small set of service standards for its highest-volume, highest-friction services, stable across the year (to prevent indicator shopping).

⊕ Second, the Compact dashboard becomes a Cabinet habit.
Quarterly review should become procedural: Reds trigger recovery plans; persistent Reds trigger rules– resources reviews. (This is the operational expression of the governance architecture in Section 4.)

⊕ Third, budgeting incorporates performance evidence.
This is the point at which performance-based budgeting stops being a slogan and becomes a budget hearing practice: programmes defend resources with service evidence, not only with precedent.

⊕ Fourth, assurance moves from pilot to routine.
Internal audit sampling and NAO performance audits should become a predictable part of the cycle, focused on efficiency and effectiveness, not merely compliance.

⊕ Fifth, capability bottlenecks are made visible.
The dashboard should track recruitment and vacancy durations for scarce roles (procurement, audit, digital, enforcement), because capability failures are often recruitment failures that become service failures.

The most important behavioural shift in 2027 is this: performance should stop being something produced for the centre and become something used by line managers. Once that happens, "performance reporting" ceases to be an artefact and becomes a tool. It is unfashionable, but this is how real reforms survive: they become useful.

4.6 2028: Embed and harden— quality, unit cost, and consequences

By 2028 the system should be sufficiently mature to harden three elements that must not be rushed in 2026.

⊕ Quality adjustment and counter-metrics.
Metrics should be strengthened so that speed is not rewarded without correctness. The report explicitly links quality measurement to methodological care and continuous development, rather than a one-off box tick [ONS quality adjustment guidance, as referenced].

⊕ Unit-cost visibility.
With stable outputs and quality proxies, the system can begin to track unit costs for selected services (cost per licence issued, cost per benefit case processed, cost per inspection), not to punish services, but to identify process redesign opportunities and justify spend-to-save investments.

⊕ Consequences through careers, not blunt bonuses.
PRB itself is sceptical about simplistic performance pay and notes that PRIS implementation is "riddled with difficulties", with evidence on efficiency gains "inconclusive and ambiguous". It proposes an interim

approach emphasising non-financial recognition, performance-based increments (including withholding/deferral for underperformance), and using performance ratings for eligibility for higher duties. The roadmap therefore treats 2028 as the point at which progression gates—starting with senior leadership—become credible because measurement and assurance have matured.

This is also where IMF guidance for small states is worth taking seriously: reforms that appear efficient can sometimes raise compensation spending unintentionally, and the discipline required is forward-looking and consistent with stable compensation-to-GDP ratios. In other words, "reform" can be fiscally expansive if not governed with care—a useful warning for 2028, when the system will be tempted to add rather than to substitute.

4.7 Minimum viable deliverables and decision points

To prevent the roadmap becoming aspirational prose, the Compact should specify a small set of deliverables with clear dates and owners:

- Cabinet-approved Covenant template + KPI dictionary (Q1 2026)

- First quarterly service dashboards from pilot services (Q2 2026)

- Allowances and overtime diagnostic + first wage-bill scoreboard (Q3 2026)

- Launch of performance-audit style assurance on delivery metrics (Q4 2026)

- Implementation and Delivery Statement (January 2027)

- Quarterly Compact dashboard institutionalised (2027 onward)

- Covenant coverage across ministries (end-2027)

- Progression gates for senior leadership based on matured KPIs (2028)

Sector and department performance framework

6.1 Purpose, scope and perimeter

This section converts the PRB-Plus architecture into department-level performance packs that can be executed, audited and—crucially—published without turning into a festival of internal PowerPoint. The logic follows the report's central contention: the productivity bargain becomes credible only when the State makes a small set of service and fiscal measures *observable, stable and contestable*—so that delivery can be discussed as engineering, not moral theatre.

⊕ Coverage (what we mean by "the Mauritian civil service" for this framework).

The department perimeter used here is aligned to the PRB 2026 "Civil Service – Volume 2 Part I" institutional list (ministries, divisions, and selected agencies) and is treated as the operating boundary for KPI packs, reporting and accountability.

6.2 The KPI pack format

Each department pack is designed to be *publishable* and *auditable*. It contains:

1. **A small basket of KPIs** across four categories—**Outputs, Outcomes, Efficiency, Governance**—with explicit counter-metrics where gaming risk is high (speed paired with error; enforcement volume paired with appeal uphold / reversals). This "basket + counter-metric" design is a deliberate behavioural safeguard, not a statistical flourish.

2. **Ownership lines** that name: the accountable officer, the operational owner, and the data steward (who signs the numbers).

3. **A measurement cadence**: monthly internal management use; quarterly public reporting for Covenant services and fiscal indicators (unless otherwise stated). The report is explicit that the dashboard must be small, regular, and taken seriously by Cabinet—not elaborately decorative.

4. **A consequence path** that links performance to the existing public-service contract: increments and higher-duty eligibility become *earned*, and underperformance becomes managed rather than politely filed. PRB's own position is pointed: variable pay evidence is "inconclusive and ambiguous", and the practical route is performance-linked progression with the ability to withhold/stop/defer increments in defined circumstances.


Figure 12 Department Dashboard Template

Figure above is the standard dashboard layout used across departments.

6.3 Sequencing: Tiering for administrative realism (2026–2028)

PRB-Plus is designed around the narrow window created by the PRB phasing decision (50% in January 2026; 100% in January 2027). The report's recommendation is explicit: **use the 12 months as a reform window**—publish the Covenant template, pilot in high-volume services, run an allowances/overtime diagnostic, begin performance audits using NAO and internal audit, and publish a short Implementation and Delivery Statement before phase two lands.

That sequencing is reflected in a three-tier KPI rollout:

- **Tier 1 (2026):** Covenant services + fiscal-critical functions (high transaction volume, high friction, high fiscal leverage).
- **Tier 2 (2027):** major service delivery ministries (scale the model once measurement is trusted).
- **Tier 3 (2028):** smaller oversight/specialist bodies (light packs, strong governance metrics).

Principle:
Start where volume, friction and fiscal leverage intersect. Scale once measurement is trusted.

Tier 3 — Oversight & specialist bodies (2028)

Tier 2 — Major service providers (2027)

Tier 1 — Covenant & fiscal-critical (2026)

Cadence:
Tier 1: monthly internal + quarterly public
Tier 2: quarterly public
Tier 3: quarterly public (light pack)

Note: Tiering is about sequencing, not importance. Oversight bodies remain constitutionally significant.

Figure 13 KPI Rollout Tiering

6.4 Tier 1 KPI packs (2026): fully specified department frameworks

Reading note on targets.
Because baseline service times and error rates are not uniformly published today, Tier 1 targets are written as a baseline-then-improve trajectory: 2026 establishes the baseline and publishes it; 2027–2028 set improvement expectations. This is deliberate: pretending we know today's medians when we do not is how KPI regimes start lying on day one.

6.4.1 Civil Status Division (CSD)

⊕ Mandate and service surface.

The Civil Status Division registers births, deaths, marriages and divorces, and provides extracts/certificates and related services—high-volume, citizen-facing transactions that shape lived trust in the State.

⊕ Why Tier 1.

Civil status is the archetypal "high-volume, high-friction" public interface suited to the Covenant: publish medians, backlogs, first-time-right and complaint resolution, with stable services across the year.

⊕ KPI matrix — Civil Status Division

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Median time to issue standard certificates (birth/death/marriage)	Efficiency	Median working days from request logged to certificate delivered (separate in-person vs online if relevant)	CSD transaction logs; monthly internal, quarterly public	*Accountable:* Registrar of Civil Status / Head of Division; *Data steward:* CSD MIS	2026: baseline + publish; 2027: reduce median by ≥20%; 2028: ≥35% (counter-metric: error/correction rate)
Backlog volume (by service type)	Output	Number of cases older than the service standard (age-banded)	CSD case register; monthly	Same as above	2026: define "over-age"; 2027–28: reduce over-age backlog by ≥30% then ≥50%
First-time-right rate	Outcome (quality proxy)	% cases completed without rework/correction within 30 days	Rework flags / correction requests; quarterly	Operational manager (front office)	Guardrail: must improve alongside speed; if speed improves but rework rises, KPI goes red
Digital end-to-end share	Efficiency / Productivity	% certificates requested, paid and delivered without physical visit	e-service logs + CSD records; quarterly	Head of Division + MITCI service owner	2026: baseline; 2027: +15pp; 2028: +30pp (must not increase exclusion—track assisted digital)
Complaint resolution time	Governance / Service quality	Median days to close a complaint with documented outcome	Complaint register; quarterly	Head of Division	2026: baseline; 2027: ≥80% closed within 20 working days; 2028: ≥90%
Data integrity exceptions	Governance	Number of material data errors found in periodic internal checks (duplicates, inconsistent entries)	Internal audit sampling; quarterly	Head of Division + Internal Audit	2026: establish checks; 2027–28: downward trend; red if rising 2 quarters

Implementation notes (pragmatic). CSD should publish only the top 4–6 services (the ones citizens actually use weekly), and keep them stable for a year; changing the scoreboard mid-game is how institutions simulate progress without doing the work. The department should also run one "failure-mode review" per quarter: where delays cluster (document verification, cash handling, printing, staffing rosters), and what process step is the constraint—because constraints, unlike excuses, are measurable.

6.4.2 Corporate and Business Registration Department (CBRD)

⊕ Mandate and service surface.
CBRD registers companies, partnerships and business names, provides incorporation/registration and maintains relevant registers and services.

⊕ Why Tier 1.
Corporate registration is a national productivity function in miniature: if the "start a business" interface is slow, the economy pays the tax in time and uncertainty. The Covenant's logic explicitly treats licences and permits as part of national productivity, not bureaucratic housekeeping.

⊕ KPI matrix — CBRD

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Median time to incorporate/register (standard cases)	Efficiency	Median working days from complete application to registration	Registry system logs; monthly internal, quarterly public	*Accountable:* Registrar of Companies; *Data steward:* Registry MIS	2026: baseline + publish; 2027: −25%; 2028: −40% (counter-metric: rejection/error rate)
Application completeness at first submission	Outcome (quality proxy)	% applications received "complete" (no avoidable follow-ups)	Front-office check logs; quarterly	Ops lead + service design owner	Improves via better guidance and digital forms; rising speed with falling completeness triggers review
Backlog over service standard	Output	Count of cases older than published standard	Case ageing report; monthly	Registrar	2027–28: halve over-age backlog
Digital end-to-end share	Productivity / Efficiency	% registrations completed without physical visit	e-service analytics; quarterly	Registrar + MITCI	2026 baseline; +20pp by 2028
Unit cost per registration	Efficiency / Fiscal	Total operating cost ÷ completed registrations (standardised)	MoF cost centre + volume; quarterly	Registrar + MoF performance budget unit	2026 baseline; 2027–28 downward trend while quality stable
Governance: audit exceptions / data lineage sign-off	Governance	Timely reconciliations; documented sign-off on published numbers	Internal audit; quarterly	Registrar + Internal Audit	Red if two quarters without sign-off or material exceptions

Implementation notes.
CBRD is an ideal site for the report's recommended "first quarterly service performance dashboards" in the April–June 2026 pilot window. The KPI pack should be paired with one simple operational reform: a "complete-case pathway" (if the application is complete, it is processed within the standard; if incomplete, it is rejected quickly with a precise deficiency list). This improves speed without creating a hidden backlog of half-cases.

6.4.3 Registrar-General's Department (RGD)

⊕ Mandate and service surface.

RGD maintains a repository of registered documents relating to immovable and movable property transactions; the Registrar-General acts as Conservator of Mortgages and Receiver of Dues, among other functions.

⊕ Why Tier 1.

Property transactions are economically high-stakes and politically sensitive; delays impose real costs. RGD is also explicitly linked to digital service changes (online one-stop shop for registration of motor vehicles) that should translate into measurable cycle time and error reductions, not merely a new front-end.

⊕ KPI matrix — RGD

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Median time to register deeds/mortgages (standard)	Efficiency	Median working days from complete lodgement to registration	RGD register; quarterly public	*Accountable:* Registrar-General; *Data steward:* RGD MIS	2026 baseline; 2027 −15%; 2028 −30% (counter-metric: legal challenges / corrections)
Backlog and age profile	Output	Over-age cases by service type	Case ageing; monthly	Registrar-General	2027–28 reduce over-age backlog ≥40%
First-time-right	Outcome (quality proxy)	% filings registered without correction requests	Correction logs; quarterly	Registration Officer Cadre lead	Must improve alongside speed
Revenue collection reconciliation	Governance / Fiscal	Reconciled dues/taxes collected vs assessed (timely)	MoF receipts + RGD; monthly	Registrar-General + MoF internal control	Red if reconciliation late 2 consecutive months
Digital transaction share (where legally feasible)	Efficiency	% transactions submitted and processed via digital channel	System logs; quarterly	Registrar-General + MITCI	Baseline 2026; +15pp by 2028

Implementation notes.
RGD's "quality proxies" matter: speed without correctness simply moves cost to lawyers and courts. For RGD, the Covenant should therefore publish both turnaround time and correction/legal reversal proxies—exactly the trade-off the report warns must be made explicit in complex domains.

6.4.4 Central Procurement Board (CPB)

⊕ Mandate and service surface.

The CPB exists to achieve efficient and cost-effective procurement in ministries/departments; it processes procurement cases above thresholds under the Public Procurement Act 2006 and advises on procurement matters.

⊕ Why Tier 1.

Procurement is where fiscal sustainability meets delivery reality. If cycle times are long, projects slip; if governance is weak, costs creep—often quietly, then suddenly.

⊕ KPI matrix — CPB

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Median procurement cycle time (by method)	Efficiency	Median days from complete submission to award decision	CPB case tracking; quarterly public	*Accountable:* Chair/Head CPB; *Data steward:* CPB MIS	2026 baseline; 2027 −15%; 2028 −25% (counter-metric: upheld challenges/appeals)
Competition intensity	Outcome	Average valid bids per tender (by category)	Tender data; quarterly	CPB	Guardrail: speed improvements must not reduce competition
% procurements delivered within original award value	Outcome / Fiscal	Share of contracts with variations within tolerance	Contract management reports; quarterly	CPB + procuring ministries	Baseline 2026; improve annually
Procurement plan discipline	Output / Governance	% high-value procurements with approved procurement plan before initiation	Ministry procurement plans; semi-annual	CPB + PPO	2027: ≥80%; 2028: ≥90%
Complaints / review cases: closure time	Governance	Median days to close review/complaint with documented outcome	Review logs; quarterly	CPB	2026 baseline; target tightened 2027–28
Audit exceptions (procurement compliance)	Governance	Material exceptions raised in audits (severity-weighted)	NAO/Internal audit; annual	CPB + NAO	Downward trend; red if severe exceptions repeat

Implementation notes.
CPB KPIs should be reported with a distinction between delays caused by CPB and delays caused by incomplete submissions—otherwise the numbers teach the wrong lesson and incentivise the wrong behaviour. A blunt metric creates a blunt bureaucracy.

6.4.5 Procurement Policy Office (PPO)

⊕ Mandate and service surface.

PPO is an independent body under the Public Procurement Act 2006 responsible for transparency, fairness and efficiency in procurement; it formulates policy, monitors the system, facilitates improvements, and runs training programmes and external cooperation.

⊕ Why Tier 1.

PPO is the system-builder: CPB can improve cycle time, but PPO must prevent that improvement from being achieved by quietly lowering standards.

⊕ KPI matrix — PPO

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Compliance coverage	Governance	% of procuring entities covered by annual compliance monitoring plan	PPO monitoring plan; annual	*Accountable:* Director PPO	2026 baseline; expand coverage 2027–28
System improvement actions delivered	Output	# of implemented policy/system improvements (standard docs, guidance, thresholds)	PPO work programme; quarterly	Director PPO	Minimum deliverables per year
Training reach and completion	Output / Productivity	# trained (public officials/suppliers) and completion rate	PPO training records; quarterly	Director PPO	2027–28 increase reach with quality feedback
Procurement transparency index (publishability)	Governance	% key procurement datasets published (tender notices, awards, timelines)	Publication logs; quarterly	Director PPO + MoF	2026 baseline; improve annually
Stakeholder satisfaction	Outcome	Survey score of procuring entities/suppliers on clarity and predictability	Survey; annual	Director PPO	Use as diagnostic, not bonus trigger

6.4.6 Statistics Mauritius

⊕ Mandate and service surface.

Statistics Mauritius produces official statistics across economic, demographic and social activities (except health statistics), aiming for timely, relevant and reliable outputs consistent with international principles and standards.

⊕ Why Tier 1.

Measurement is not decoration in a productivity compact; it is the enabling infrastructure. If statistics are late or distrusted, the whole apparatus reverts to anecdote.

⊕ KPI matrix — Statistics Mauritius

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Release punctuality (key series)	Output	% key scheduled releases published on time	Release calendar; quarterly	*Accountable:* Director of Statistics	2026 baseline; 2027 ≥90%; 2028 ≥95%
Revision transparency	Governance	% key series with published revision policy and revision table	Publications; annual	Director	Red if revisions occur without explanation
Data collection efficiency	Efficiency	Cost per completed survey/census module (standardised)	Finance + survey ops; annual	Director + MoF	Downward trend without quality loss
User trust/satisfaction	Outcome	Survey of key users (MoF, ministries, private sector)	Annual survey	Director	Diagnostic only; not used for pay
Staff capacity risk indicator	Governance	Vacancy duration in scarce statistical roles	HRMIS; quarterly	Director + MPSAR	Escalate if vacancy duration rising 2 quarters

6.4.7 Ministry of Finance — Treasury (and fiscal performance dashboard ownership)

⊕ Mandate and service surface.

Treasury is the backbone for fiscal reporting, payments, cash management and the credibility of the medium-term path. In PRB-Plus terms, it owns the "quiet indicators" that show whether the State is staying within its fiscal envelope.

⊕ Why Tier 1.

The report calls for a **wage-bill anchor** disclosed annually and monitored via a quarterly dashboard—compensation (including allowances/overtime) as share of GDP, revenue and recurrent expenditure; borrowing deviations; short-term domestic debt share and maturity; interest share of revenue; plus delivery medians for Covenant services and vacancy durations in scarce roles. The Treasury is the natural custodian of that scoreboard.

⊕ KPI matrix — Treasury

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Wage-bill scoreboard published	Output / Governance	Quarterly publication of the wage-bill scoreboard against the anchor (incl. allowances/overtime)	Treasury + payroll aggregates; quarterly public	*Accountable:* Financial Secretary / Treasury head	2026: first publication by Q3; then quarterly
Budget execution reporting timeliness	Output	Monthly execution report issued within X working days of month-end	Treasury systems; monthly	Treasury head	Tighten standard over time
Payment processing time (suppliers)	Efficiency	Median days from verified invoice to payment	IFMIS/ledger; monthly	Treasury head	Baseline 2026; reduce 2027–28
Borrowing deviation signal	Governance	Material deviations from published medium-term path flagged with explanation	MoF macro-fiscal; quarterly	MoF/Treasury	Red if un-explained deviations recur
Data lineage sign-off	Governance	Named sign-off on published dashboard metrics	Internal control; quarterly	Treasury + internal audit	Mandatory; red if absent

Implementation notes.
The report explicitly recommends completing an allowances and overtime diagnostic by July–September 2026 and publishing the first wage-bill scoreboard against the anchor—because this is where wage-bill surprises often live. In practical terms: Treasury owns the numbers; MPSAR owns the HR rules; NAO provides assurance.

6.4.8 Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reforms (MPSAR)

⊕ Mandate and operating role.

MPSAR formulates and implements HR strategies and policies, and is organised across divisions including HR management, safety and health, administrative reforms, HR development, and a public sector business transformation bureau.

⊕ Why Tier 1.

PRB's own performance architecture assigns system leadership and monitoring to MPSAR, with MoF integrating performance-based budgeting and NAO using performance information for audits—"strategy/HR, finance, audit" as the survival structure for performance management beyond launch enthusiasm.

⊕ KPI matrix — MPSAR (system KPIs)

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Digital ROPMS adoption	Output / Productivity	% ministries/agencies using the digital ROPMS for appraisal cycle	ROPMS platform logs; quarterly	*Accountable:* Secretary for Public Service	2026 pilot ministries; 2027 scale; 2028 full coverage
Appraisal timeliness	Efficiency / Governance	% appraisals completed by deadline (PRB notes delays as a chronic failure mode)	ROPMS logs; quarterly	Secretary for Public Service	2026 baseline; 2027 ≥85%; 2028 ≥95%
Rating distribution integrity	Governance	Share of staff rated in each performance band (detect inflation)	ROPMS; annual	MPSAR performance unit	Red if distribution implausibly compressed without justification
Underperformance actions documented	Governance	% underperformance cases with documented improvement plan / action	HR case files; quarterly	HRM division	Baseline 2026; improve annually
Progression "earned" compliance	Governance / Fiscal discipline	% increments/higher-duty assignments aligned with performance criteria	HRMIS + ROPMS; annual	Secretary + PSC liaison	Implements PRB's recommendation to withhold/defer increments where warranted

Implementation notes.
MPSAR is where the reform either becomes an operating system—or remains an HR ritual. PRB's warning is explicit: analogue performance systems almost guarantee ritual; digitalisation does not guarantee seriousness, but it makes seriousness possible to observe.

6.4.9 Social Security and National Solidarity Division (Ministry of Social Integration, Social Security and National Solidarity)

⊕ Mandate and service surface.

The Division administers social security and benefit schemes including the Basic Retirement Pension and other assistance (the PRB text lists a broad suite of benefits and services).

⊕ Why Tier 1.

 Benefits administration is explicitly named as a pilot domain in April–June 2026: it is high-volume, politically salient, and measurable without philosophical arguments—processing times, error/overpayment rates, complaint resolution, and appeal outcomes.

⊕ KPI matrix — Social Security & National Solidarity Division

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Median time to decide standard benefit applications	Efficiency	Median working days from complete application to decision	Benefits system; monthly internal, quarterly public	*Accountable:* Head of Division	Baseline 2026; −20% by 2027; −35% by 2028 (counter-metric: appeal overturn rate)
Payment accuracy	Outcome / Governance	% payments correct (no under/overpayment)	Payment QA checks; quarterly	Ops head + internal control	Improve annually; red if accuracy falls
Overpayment recovery cycle time	Efficiency / Fiscal	Median days from detection to recovery plan initiated	Recovery case logs; quarterly	Head of Division	Baseline 2026; reduce annually
First-time-right (documentation)	Output quality proxy	% cases not returned for missing info	Case management; quarterly	Front office lead	Improve via guidance and assisted digital
Complaint resolution time	Governance	Median days to close complaint with documented resolution	Complaint register; quarterly	Head of Division	Tighten 2027–28
Digital end-to-end share (where feasible)	Productivity	% applications submitted and tracked digitally	e-services; quarterly	Head of Division + MITCI	Baseline 2026; +20pp by 2028

Implementation notes.
For benefits, "speed" without quality becomes cruelty by spreadsheet; hence the mandatory pairing of decision time with appeal/accuracy measures. This is precisely the guardrail logic set out in the Covenant design: basket metrics, and explicit quality proxies where the service is complex.

6.4.10 Mauritius Police Force (MPF) and Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) — paired governance pack

⊕ **MPF mandate.**
The MPF is the primary law enforcement agency and carries police, security, military and naval functions; the PRB document cites an approximate strength of 12,500 police officers and notes operational organisation into divisions.

⊕ **Why Tier 1.**
Public safety is not reducible to a call centre. Nonetheless, the Covenant logic still applies: publish a small set of operational and governance measures that make performance legible without incentivising the wrong behaviour (speed paired with complaint integrity; enforcement paired with reversals/complaints).

⊕ **KPI matrix — MPF (system-level, non-perverse)**

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Emergency response time (priority calls)	Efficiency / Service quality	Median minutes from dispatch to arrival for priority categories	Command/control logs; quarterly public (aggregated)	*Accountable:* Commissioner of Police	Baseline 2026; improve annually (counter-metric: complaint rate re response handling)
Case file completion timeliness	Output	% investigations reaching defined procedural milestone within standard timeframe (by case category)	Case management; quarterly	Divisional commanders	Avoid "clearance theatre": pair with quality proxy below
Procedural quality proxy	Governance	% case files returned for material deficiencies by prosecutors/courts (aggregated)	File review records; quarterly	Commissioner + training	Must not worsen as speed improves
Overtime / extra-hours reliance	Efficiency / Fiscal	Overtime/extra-hours as % of wage bill; roster stability	Payroll + duty rosters; quarterly	MPF admin + MoF	Reduce structural reliance where possible (ties to allowances diagnostic)
Public complaint handling time	Governance	Median days to acknowledge and close complaints (internal + IPCC where relevant)	Complaints registers; quarterly	MPF Professional Standards + IPCC	Baseline 2026; tighten 2027–28

IPCC pack (oversight integrity).
IPCC is a constitutional-style safeguard. Its KPI pack is intentionally governance-heavy: timeliness, backlog, transparency of outcomes (aggregated), and implementation tracking of recommendations. (If you want, I can pull the PRB/IPCC text and produce a fully referenced IPCC-specific pack in the next iteration.)

6.4.11 National Audit Office (NAO) — performance audit enablement

⊕ Why Tier 1.

PRB's institutional architecture explicitly places NAO as the body that uses ROPMS information for performance audits on efficiency and effectiveness—not merely procedural compliance. That is the accountability spine of the Compact: HR + finance + audit, acting together.

⊕ KPI matrix — NAO (Compact-relevant)

KPI	Category	What it measures (definition)	Data source & frequency	Owner & accountability	2026–2028 trajectory / guardrails
Performance audits launched (delivery-metric focused)	Output	# audits focusing on timeliness, error rates, backlog, unit costs (not only compliance)	NAO work programme; annual	Auditor-General	2026: launch first wave as per PRB-Plus sequencing
Recommendation implementation rate	Outcome	% high-priority recommendations implemented within agreed timeframe	Follow-up tracking; semi-annual	NAO + audited entities	Escalate persistent non-implementation to Cabinet committee
Data assurance sign-offs	Governance	% Covenant dashboard metrics with auditable lineage and named sign-off	Audit sampling; quarterly	NAO	Red if data lineage absent or inconsistent
Time to issue audit reports	Efficiency	Median time from fieldwork close to report issuance	NAO; annual	NAO	Improve through standardisation

6.5 Cross-department implementation rules (how these packs "bite")

The packs above are designed to work with the governance machinery already set out in the report:

- **Cabinet approves the Covenant template and reporting schedule**; ministries publish quarterly for their Covenant services, keeping the service list stable for at least a year.

- **Ownership is named and personal.** The Covenant is not "owned by a unit"; accountability rests with Permanent Secretaries and heads of agencies. This is reputational enforcement, which often works better in small states than pseudo-market bonus schemes.

- **Remuneration linkage is deliberately conservative at first.** Consistent with PRB's scepticism about PRIS and its recommended interim approach, the performance "bite" comes from: progression being earned, increments being withholdable/deferrable for underperformance, and higher-duty eligibility being tied to performance ratings rather than seniority alone.

- **Audit shifts from paperwork compliance to delivery reality.** By October–December 2026, NAO and internal audit begin audits that examine timeliness, error rates and backlogs—not only whether the form was signed in blue ink.

6.6 Sector Scorecard Summary

The **Sector Scorecard Summary** table below shows for each department: Tier, top 3 Covenant services, and the single fiscal/efficiency metric that matters most (so leaders can see the forest before the trees).

Sector / Policy Area	Department / Entity	Tier (2026 rollout)	Top 3 Covenant services (proposed candidates)	Single fiscal/efficiency metric (headline)
Central Government	Prime Minister's Office	Tier 1	Cabinet memo clearance; Cross' ministerial 'blocker' resolution; Government Information Service releases	Median policy clearance cycle time (working days)
Public Finance	Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development	Tier 1	Supplier invoice payment; Budget execution reporting; Wage bill scoreboard publication	Compensation of employees as % of revenue (quarterly)
Public Finance	The Treasury (MoF)	Tier 1	Supplier payment processing; Monthly execution statements; Quarterly Compact fiscal dashboard	Median days from verified invoice to payment
Public Finance	Registrar General's Department	Tier 1	Deed/mortgage registration; Dues collection reconciliation; Certified extracts issuance	Median days to register standard deeds/mortgages
Public Finance	Central Procurement Board	Tier 1	High value tender processing; Bid evaluation cycle; Procurement complaint handling (where applicable)	Median tender-to-award cycle time (days)
Public Finance	Procurement Policy Office	Tier 1	Procurement policy/guidance issuance; Transparency dataset publication; Training/capability support	Publication timeliness of tender/award datasets (%)
Economic Governance	Statistics Mauritius	Tier 1	Key statistical releases; Administrative data integration; Open'data updates	Release calendar adherence (%)
Civil Service Reform	Ministry of Public Service, Administrative and Institutional Reforms	Tier 1	Vacancy filling pipeline; ROPMS/IPMF roll-out; Redeployment/mobility processing	Median vacancy fill cycle time (days)
Civil Service Reform	Public Service Commission	Tier 1	Recruitment exercises; Appeals resolution; Probation confirmation processing	Median time-to-hire (days) for priority posts
Local Government Governance	Local Government Service Commission	Tier 1	Local authority recruitment; Disciplinary case processing; Redeployment approvals	Vacancy rate in critical local services (%)
Citizen Identity & Registers	Civil Status Division	Tier 1	Birth/death/marriage certificate issuance; Corrections/annotations; Complaint handling	Median days to issue standard certificates
Business Environment	Corporate and Business Registration Department	Tier 1	Company incorporation; Annual filings/updates; Compliance enforcement notices	Median days to incorporate/register (standard cases)
Public Safety	Police Department (Mauritius Police Force)	Tier 1	Emergency response to priority calls; Investigation milestone progression; Public complaints handling	Overtime intensity (overtime as % of payroll)
Public Accountability	National Audit Office	Tier 1	Performance audits (efficiency/effectiveness); Audit follow-up; Data assurance sampling	Recommendation implementation rate (%)

Sector / Policy Area	Department / Entity	Tier (2026 rollout)	Top 3 Covenant services (proposed candidates)	Single fiscal/efficiency metric (headline)
Public Health	Ministry of Health and Wellness	Tier 2	Outpatient appointment access; Elective surgery scheduling; Pharmacy dispensing (stock-out prevention)	Cost per treated case (case mix adjusted)
Education & Skills	Ministry of Education, Tertiary Education, Science and Technology	Tier 2	School enrolment/placement; Examination/certification processing; Teacher deployment/posting	Recurrent cost per pupil (by level)
Local Services	Ministry of Local Government, Disaster and Risk Management	Tier 2	Household waste collection; Building/operating permits; Drainage/flood response	Cost per tonne collected
Infrastructure	Ministry of National Infrastructure and Community Development	Tier 2	Road maintenance response; Capital project milestones; Contractor payment certification	Unit cost per km maintained
Transport	Ministry of Land Transport and Light Rail	Tier 2	Route/permit approvals; Vehicle service/licensing transactions; Public transport punctuality monitoring	Median days to process priority licences/permits
Transport	National Land Transport Authority	Tier 2	Operator licensing; Compliance inspections; Customer complaint handling	Median licence processing time (days)
Environment & Waste	Ministry of Environment, Solid Waste Management and Climate Change	Tier 2	Environmental permits; Compliance inspections; Waste-management incident response	Median days for environmental permit decisions
Energy & Utilities	Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities	Tier 2	New connection requests; Outage restoration; Water service complaint resolution	Service interruption duration (SAIDI / hours)
Housing & Land	Ministry of Housing and Land Use Planning	Tier 2	Planning permission decisions; Housing allocation; Land valuation/clearances	Cost per completed housing unit (programme)
Jobs & Labour	Ministry of Labour, Human Resource Development and Training	Tier 2	Work related permits/registrations; Labour dispute conciliation; Labour inspections	Median days to resolve disputes/conciliation
Markets & Consumer	Ministry of Commerce and Consumer Protection	Tier 2	Consumer complaints; Market inspections/enforcement; Licensing/permits in remit	Median complaint resolution time (days)
Justice	Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Institutional Reforms	Tier 2	Registry services; Case processing/backlog reduction; Legal aid/assistance transactions (where applicable)	Backlog over-threshold rate (%) for priority case types
Digital Government	Ministry of Information Technology, Communication and Innovation	Tier 2	Priority services digitised end-to-end; Platform uptime; Cyber incident response	Unit cost-to-serve for digitised transactions
Food & Agriculture	Ministry of Agroindustry and Food Security	Tier 2	Phytosanitary/food safety certification; Inspections; Farmer support scheme processing	Median days to issue priority certificates
Ocean Economy	Ministry of Blue Economy, Marine Resources, Fisheries and Shipping	Tier 2	Fishing/vessel licensing; Compliance inspections; Port/sector facilitation actions	Median days to process licences/permits
Tourism	Ministry of Tourism	Tier 2	Tourism business licensing; Inspections/compliance; Industry complaint handling	Median days for licence/permit decisions
Social Protection	Ministry of Social Security and National Solidarity	Tier 1	Benefit application decisions; Payment processing; Complaints/appeals handling	Overpayment/error rate (% of payments)
Social Inclusion	Ministry of Social Integration and Economic Empowerment	Tier 2	Beneficiary onboarding; Case management reviews; Graduation/outcome verification	Cost per verified â€˜graduation' outcome
Gender & Family	Ministry of Gender Equality and Family Welfare	Tier 2	Priority protection case response; Shelter placement; Interagency referral closures	Median response time for priority cases
Youth & Sport	Ministry of Youth Empowerment, Sports and Recreation	Tier 2	Youth programme enrolment; Facility utilisation/booking; Grants to federations/associations	Cost per participant (verified)
Industry & SMEs	Ministry of Industrial Development, SMEs and Cooperatives	Tier 2	SME support decisions; Cooperative registration; Advisory/aftercare services	Cost per supported firm (by instrument)
Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and International Trade	Tier 2	Consular case processing; Trade facilitation interventions; International agreements deliverables	Median consular case turnaround time

Sector / Policy Area	Department / Entity	Tier (2026 rollout)	Top 3 Covenant services (proposed candidates)	Single fiscal/efficiency metric (headline)
Governance	Ministry of Financial Services and Good Governance	Tier 2	Governance compliance support (public bodies); Transparency/report publication; Integrity case handling (where applicable)	Audit findings closure rate within 90 days (%)
Culture	Ministry of Arts and Cultural Heritage	Tier 2	Heritage site access/services; Cultural grant programmes; Public events/facility services	Operating cost per visitor (selected sites)
Water & Irrigation	Irrigation Authority	Tier 2	Scheme reliability/uptime; Maintenance requests; Water delivery scheduling	Cost per hectare served
Aviation Regulation	Department of Civil Aviation	Tier 2	Licensing/certification; Safety oversight audits; Findings closure tracking	% safety findings closed within timeline
Parliamentary Oversight	Mauritius National Assembly	Tier 3	Hansard/proceedings publication; Committee report tabling; PAC follow-up tracking	% PAC recommendations with executive response within 90 days
Administrative Justice	Office of the Ombudsman	Tier 3	Complaint intake; Complaint investigation/closure; Recommendation follow-up	Median complaint closure time (days)
Human Rights	National Human Rights Commission	Tier 3	Case intake; Investigation completion; Recommendation follow-up	Median case resolution time (days)
Electoral Integrity	Office of the Electoral Commissioner	Tier 3	Register updates; Polling readiness milestones; Complaint handling	% readiness milestones met by deadline
Financial Complaints	Office for Ombudsperson for Financial Services	Tier 3	Complaint resolution; Mediation/decision issuance; Systemic issue escalation	Median complaint resolution time (days)
Archives & Records	National Archives Department	Tier 3	Access request fulfilment; Cataloguing; Digitisation of priority records	Median days to fulfil access requests
Arts Funding	National Arts Fund	Tier 3	Grant decision processing; Post-award monitoring; Reporting compliance enforcement	Median days from submission to grant decision

Appendix

KPI Dictionary

1 Purpose

The KPI dictionary is the Compact's "constitution". It prevents three predictable failures: re-defining success after the fact; drifting denominators that make comparisons meaningless; and the quiet substitution of activity metrics for service metrics. A dictionary is not bureaucracy—it is a credibility instrument. When definitions are stable, performance becomes discussable. When definitions are fluid, performance becomes theatrical.

2 What the dictionary must contain

Each KPI entry needs, at minimum: a unique ID, category (Output/Outcome/Efficiency/Governance), a plain-English definition, a numerator/denominator boundary statement, disaggregation rules (so variance is locatable), frequency (internal vs public), the system of record, and the accountable/operational/data/assurance owners.

3 Definition freeze and change control

Definitions should be frozen for **12 months** unless the Compact Secretariat approves a change on explicit methodological grounds. Any change must be logged with a stated impact on comparability (low/medium/high). This is what stops "improvement by reclassification".

The workbook is available on request to osf@bramston.associates.

Data lineage and assurance

1 Why lineage is non-negotiable

In a productivity compact, a KPI that cannot be traced is not an indicator; it is a narrative with formatting. The lineage standard makes the numbers **contestable**: an internal auditor (and, periodically, the NAO) can replicate the calculation from the source record.

2 Data lineage statement (template)

Every published KPI should have an internal lineage statement with: source systems/registers, extraction method, coverage period, case boundary definition, completeness definition, transformations, reconciliation checks, known limitations, sampling trail, and definition version.

3 Standard data-quality checks (minimum viable)

To keep assurance realistic, the framework uses a small number of routine checks (completeness, duplicates, date logic, outliers, reconciliation, and change control). These checks are designed to be run monthly or quarterly without creating a second civil service inside the first.

The workbook is available on request to osf@bramston.associates.

Baseline capture tables

1 Baseline logic

Baselines are not a statistical nicety; they are a safeguard against two forms of self-deception:

- declaring "improvement" without a stable starting point; and

- using a short window that can be managed or distorted by seasonality.

The baseline standard is therefore practical: **8–12 weeks of normal operations** where possible, reporting **median and p90**, and treating "paused" cases explicitly (paused cases are the easiest place to hide delay).

2 What is captured

For each Covenant service: volume closed, median and p90 turnaround, backlog over standard, first-time-right and error/rework proxies, complaints rate, unit cost where available, and a data completeness score.

This structure is intentionally consistent across departments so the Compact Secretariat can aggregate without inventing bespoke logic every month.

The workbook is available on request to osf@bramston.associates.

Pilot results

1 What pilots must prove (and what they must not pretend)

Pilot reporting is designed to be frank. Early pilots can use simple pre–post comparisons, provided counter-metrics are published and seasonality is acknowledged. The purpose is to learn quickly and scale carefully—not to construct perfect attribution.

A pilot is **not** successful if speed improves and quality proxies worsen materially. That is not productivity; it is displacement.

2 Pilot results template

Each pilot result records: baseline and pilot periods, KPI changes, counter-metric behaviour, interpretation of causes, cost/resource implications, and a decision (scale/adjust/stop), with an "evidence quality" rating to prevent overconfidence.

E.3 Lessons log (the part people skip, to their cost)

The lessons log is where the real learning sits: bottlenecks observed, root cause, fixes, impact direction, residual risks, and ownership. Over time, this becomes a reusable "playbook" for scaling reforms across ministries.

The workbook is available on request to osf@bramston.associates.

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Glossary

Glossary A: Performance, budgeting, and the Compact architecture

Acronym / Term	Full form	Meaning in this document	Note
Compact	Productivity–Fiscal Compact (2026–2035)	The policy bargain linking public pay, productivity improvements, and fiscal sustainability over 2026–2035	Operates through published service standards, wage-bill anchors, and enforceable escalation
Productivity Covenant	(Term used in this report)	The ministry/department-level "contract" that lists a small set of services, KPIs, definitions, cadence, and escalation rules	The Covenant is the publishable front-end of the Compact
PRB	Pay Research Bureau (Mauritius)	The statutory-style pay-setting institution producing PRB reports/recommendations (including PRB 2026)	Provides the pay framework and the performance-management direction
PRB 2026	PRB Report 2026	The 2026 pay review and reform recommendations	Implemented in phases (Jan 2026 and Jan 2027)
PRB phasing	—	The staged implementation of PRB award costs	Treated here as a *timer* to build delivery machinery
PRB-Plus	(Term used in this report)	PRB implementation paired with enforceable productivity/service governance	Not a new pay scheme; an operating discipline layered onto PRB
KPI	Key Performance Indicator	A measurable indicator used for publication, management, and accountability	Must be definable, auditable, and paired with guardrails
Output KPI	—	Measures what a department produces (volume, throughput, cases processed)	High gaming risk unless paired with quality proxies
Outcome KPI	—	Measures what changes for citizens/businesses/the State	Attribution is harder; used selectively
Efficiency KPI	—	Measures cost/time/resource optimisation (median time, backlog, unit cost)	Often the fastest route to visible productivity gains
Governance KPI	—	Measures compliance/control effectiveness (audit closure, transparency, data integrity)	Prevents "performance theatre"
Counter-metric	—	A paired metric designed to prevent gaming (e.g., speed paired with error/rework)	Mandatory for high-incentive KPIs
Quality proxy	—	A measurable stand-in for service quality (e.g., first-time-right, appeal overturn rate)	Used when "true quality" is difficult to measure directly
IPMF	Integrated Performance Management Framework	The integrated framework linking performance management and performance-based budgeting	The "wiring diagram" for system-wide performance management
ROPMS	Results-Oriented Performance Management System	PRB's proposed/endorsed results-focused performance management approach	The performance system the Compact expects to use (preferably digitally)

Acronym / Term	Full form	Meaning in this document	Note
PRIS	Performance-Related Incentive Scheme	The performance incentive/pay-related scheme discussed by PRB	Treated cautiously; evidence on gains is ambiguous
PBB	Performance-Based Budgeting	Budgeting approach linking resource allocation to performance outputs/outcomes	Key to making KPIs fiscally meaningful
Dashboard	—	A small, recurring published set of KPIs	Must be few, stable, and taken seriously (or it becomes decorative)
Internal pack	—	The monthly, richer operational KPI set used by managers	"Manage more than you publish" principle
Assurance layer	—	Sampling, reconciliation, definition control, audit trails	Converts KPIs from "claims" into contestable evidence
Service standard	—	A defined expected performance level for a service (e.g., median time, p90 time)	Becomes the citizen-facing contract
Service Recovery Plan	(SRP) (term used, sometimes without acronym)	A formal remedial plan triggered by persistent "Red" performance	Triggered procedurally (e.g., 2 consecutive quarters Red)
Escalation rule	—	Pre-defined thresholds moving issues up the chain	Prevents crisis-only governance
Definition freeze	—	Locking KPI definitions for a fixed period (typically 12 months)	Prevents improvement by redefinition
Data lineage statement	—	A documented chain from KPI back to source system/register and extraction logic	Required for publication-grade KPIs
A–O–D–S roles	Accountable / Operational / Data / Assurance	The minimum ownership set for each KPI	Stops "ownership by PowerPoint"
Accounting Officer	—	The senior official formally accountable for a ministry/department's administration	Typically the Permanent Secretary (PS) or agency head

Glossary B: Mauritian institutions, oversight bodies, and departments

Acronym / Term	Full form	Meaning in this document	Note
PMO	Prime Minister's Office	Central coordinating office; referenced for Cabinet governance and delivery coordination	Natural home for cross-ministerial "blocker" resolution
Cabinet	Cabinet of Ministers	Highest executive decision body; sets Compact anchors and reviews quarterly Reds	The escalation endpoint must be real and predictable
MoF	Ministry of Finance (and related portfolio naming)	Fiscal owner of anchors, dashboards, and PBB integration	Owns the wage-bill scoreboard discipline
Treasury	The Treasury (within MoF)	Cash management, execution reporting, payments, fiscal reporting discipline	Controls the "quiet indicators" of drift
MPSAR	Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reforms	Public service HR policy owner (older/common naming)	Used for HR and performance system ownership
MPSAIR	Ministry of Public Service, Administrative and Institutional Reforms	Public service HR and institutional reform owner (expanded naming used in the report)	Owner of IPMF/ROPMS governance and rollout

Acronym / Term	Full form	Meaning in this document	Note
PSC	Public Service Commission	Recruitment/appointments and related public service staffing processes	Time-to-hire and staffing bottlenecks matter to service delivery
LGSC	Local Government Service Commission	Recruitment/HR governance for local authorities	Critical for frontline local service capacity
NAO	National Audit Office	External public audit body; includes performance auditing role	Assurance spine of the Compact
PAC	Public Accounts Committee	Parliamentary oversight committee for audit findings and public finance scrutiny	Forces follow-up visibility and consequence
CSD	Civil Status Division	Civil registration services (births, deaths, marriages; certificates)	High-volume Tier 1 Covenant service candidate
CBRD	Corporate and Business Registration Department	Business/company registration and registry services	Business environment friction point
RGD	Registrar-General's Department	Registration repository for property-related transactions and dues	High-stakes service with quality/speed trade-offs
CPB	Central Procurement Board	Processes high-value procurement; procurement governance and timeliness	Procurement cycle time + governance is fiscally material
PPO	Procurement Policy Office	Procurement policy/oversight, training, transparency	System-builder; prevents "fast but sloppy" procurement
MPF	Mauritius Police Force (referred to as Police Department/MPF)	National law enforcement body	KPI design must avoid perverse incentives
IPCC	Independent Police Complaints Commission	Oversight body for police complaints (paired governance pack concept)	Governance KPIs: complaint handling and recommendation follow-up
MITCI	Ministry of Information Technology, Communication and Innovation	Digital government enabler; digitisation and platform reliability	Digitalisation is measurement infrastructure, not just convenience
Statistics Mauritius	—	Official statistics producer	Release punctuality and trust underpin evidence-based policy
Ombudsman	Office of the Ombudsman	Administrative justice oversight	Timeliness of complaint closure is central
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission	Human rights oversight body	Case resolution and recommendation follow-up
Electoral Commissioner	Office of the Electoral Commissioner	Election administration integrity	Readiness milestones and register updates
Ombudsperson (Financial Services)	Office for Ombudsperson for Financial Services	Financial complaints resolution	Median complaint resolution time
National Archives	National Archives Department	Records and archives access/digitisation	Access fulfilment time and digitisation throughput

Glossary C: Data, operations, and measurement terms

Acronym / Term	Full form	Meaning in this document	Note
HR	Human Resources	Staffing, recruitment, performance management	A frequent bottleneck for service delivery
HRMIS	Human Resource Management Information System	HR system of record (posts, vacancies, staff movements)	Needed for vacancy duration and time-to-hire KPIs
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management Information System	Finance system of record (budget execution, payments, ledger)	Needed for payment time and execution KPIs
MIS	Management Information System	Operational reporting / information system function within departments	Often the Data Owner function for KPIs
ICT	Information and Communications Technology	Digital systems, infrastructure, service platforms	Platform reliability enables measurement and service standards
QA	Quality Assurance	Sampling, checks, reconciliations for KPI integrity	Converts metrics into contestable evidence
API	Application Programming Interface	Automated method for extracting data from systems	Reduces manual KPI production and errors
e-Procurement	Electronic procurement platform	Digital tendering/award publication ecosystem	Enables transparency KPIs and cycle time measurement
Baseline	—	Initial measurement period establishing starting performance levels	Must be long enough to resist "managed" windows
Data completeness	—	% of required fields present/usable for KPI calculation	Published internally; prevents false precision
Reconciliation	—	Cross-checking KPI counts against independent totals	Key to avoiding "metric drift"
Sampling	—	Checking a subset of cases to validate the KPI calculation	Primary assurance method for small administrations
Median	—	Middle value in a distribution (50th percentile)	Preferred to averages for queue-based services
p90	90th percentile	Value under which 90% of cases fall	Reveals "worst plausible day" for citizens
p99	99th percentile	Extreme tail performance indicator	Used for outlier review and data error detection
First-time-right	—	% cases completed without rework/correction	Core quality proxy in administrative services
Rework / correction rate	—	Share of cases requiring fixes after "completion"	Mandatory counter-metric to speed
Backlog	—	Work waiting beyond the service standard	Must be age-banded to prevent hiding delay
Over-age backlog	—	Cases older than the published service standard	Becomes a key escalation indicator
Case boundary	—	Definition of what counts as a "case" for KPI purposes	The most common source of denominator disputes
Completeness definition	—	Definition of what counts as a "complete application"	Prevents gaming by parking incomplete submissions

Glossary D: Finance, macro, and reporting terms

Acronym / Term	Full form	Meaning in this document	Note
IMF	International Monetary Fund	Referenced for Article IV consultation and macro-fiscal framing	Provides constraint envelope and fiscal credibility benchmarks
Article IV	IMF Article IV Consultation	Periodic IMF assessment of a country's economy and policy mix	Used as the external consistency check
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	Referenced for productivity measurement concepts	Supports the output–input framing
ONS	Office for National Statistics (UK)	Referenced for quality adjustment concepts in public services	Supports cautious approach to quality measurement
IFI / IFIs	International Financial Institution(s)	External partners (e.g., IMF, World Bank)	Appendix design supports IFI-grade assurance expectations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	Macro denominator for wage-bill/debt ratios	Used for anchor indicators (e.g., compensation % GDP)
FY	Fiscal Year	Budget year period (used for phasing and macro tables)	Mauritius uses July–June fiscal year
Rs	Mauritian Rupee	Currency unit used for cost references	Used for PRB cost figures
Wage bill	—	Total compensation spending for public employees (often incl. allowances)	Anchor for fiscal sustainability
Compensation of employees	—	National accounts concept for wage-bill measure	Used for cross-year comparability
Unit cost	—	Cost per output unit (cost per case/registration/tonne/km)	Converts volume into fiscal reality
CFO	Chief Financial Officer	Senior finance role at ministry level (or equivalent)	Key actor in performance–budget linkage
SAIDI	System Average Interruption Duration Index	Electricity service reliability metric (hours)	Example of a "hard" service standard for utilities

Document Acronym Index

Acronym	One-line expansion
A–O–D–S	Accountable / Operational / Data / Assurance roles assigned to every published KPI.
API	Application Programming Interface (automated system-to-system data extraction).
CBRD	Corporate and Business Registration Department (business/company registration services).
CFO	Chief Financial Officer (senior finance lead in a ministry/organisation).
CPB	Central Procurement Board (high-value public procurement processing body).
CSD	Civil Status Division (civil registration and certificate services).
DG	Director-General (senior executive head of an agency/body).
DQ	Data Quality (checks for completeness, duplicates, logic errors, reconciliations).
e-Procurement	Electronic procurement platforms and processes (tendering/awards published digitally).
FY	Fiscal Year (Mauritius budget year, typically July–June, used for macro/fiscal reporting).
GDP	Gross Domestic Product (macro denominator used for fiscal ratios).
HR	Human Resources (workforce management, recruitment, performance management).
HRMIS	Human Resource Management Information System (system of record for posts, vacancies, staff actions).
ICT	Information and Communications Technology (systems, infrastructure, platforms, service portals).
IFI / IFIs	International Financial Institution(s) (e.g., IMF, World Bank), often requiring auditable evidence.
IFMIS	Integrated Financial Management Information System (budget execution, payments, ledger controls).
IMF	International Monetary Fund (macroeconomic surveillance, Article IV consultations, fiscal analysis).
IPCC	Independent Police Complaints Commission (police oversight via complaints handling).
IPMF	Integrated Performance Management Framework (links performance management to budgeting and reporting).
KPI	Key Performance Indicator (a measurable indicator used for publication, management, and accountability).
LGSC	Local Government Service Commission (HR governance for local authorities).
MIS	Management Information System (departmental reporting/data function; often the KPI data owner).
MITCI	Ministry of Information Technology, Communication and Innovation (digital government enabler).
MoF	Ministry of Finance (fiscal anchors, budget control, PBB integration, wage-bill scoreboard).
MPF	Mauritius Police Force (national law enforcement body).
NAO	National Audit Office (external audit body, including performance/value-for-money audits).
NHRC	National Human Rights Commission (human rights oversight and case handling).
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (productivity and measurement references).
ONS	Office for National Statistics (UK) (public service output/quality adjustment references).
P/F/Q/G	Productivity / Fiscal sustainability / Quality / Governance (Compact alignment shorthand).
PAC	Public Accounts Committee (Parliamentary committee overseeing audit findings and follow-up).
PBB	Performance-Based Budgeting (allocating/justifying resources using performance evidence).

Acronym	One-line expansion
PMO	Prime Minister's Office (centre-of-government coordination and Cabinet support).
PPO	Procurement Policy Office (procurement policy, monitoring, transparency, capability building).
PRB	Pay Research Bureau (Mauritius public sector pay review and conditions body).
PRB-Plus	PRB implementation + Compact governance (pay settlement paired with enforceable delivery discipline).
PRIS	Performance-Related Incentive Scheme (performance pay mechanism discussed by PRB).
PSC	Public Service Commission (recruitment/appointments and related staffing processes).
PS	Permanent Secretary (Accounting Officer; senior administrative head of a ministry).
QA	Quality Assurance (sampling, checks and controls to validate KPI integrity).
RGD	Registrar-General's Department (registration repository for certain property and legal documents).
ROPMS	Results-Oriented Performance Management System (results-focused appraisal/performance framework).
Rs	Mauritian Rupee (currency unit used for cost and fiscal figures).
SAIDI	System Average Interruption Duration Index (electricity outage duration reliability metric).
SRP	Service Recovery Plan (formal remedial plan triggered by persistent "Red" performance).
STI-TRG0001	Internal report reference code: *The Price of the State: PRB 2026, Public Sector Pay, and the Productivity–Fiscal Compact in Mauritius (2026–2035)*.
Y/N	Yes/No (binary status used in governance/publication compliance KPIs).
p90	90th percentile (turnaround time below which 90% of cases fall; exposes tail performance).
p99	99th percentile (extreme tail; used for outlier review and data integrity checks).

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About this Document

The Price of the State is ultimately a question of design: can Mauritius pay
more and get more, without quietly borrowing the difference or letting
service quality erode by stealth? This report answers that question with an
operating model rather than a slogan. It offers a sector-by-sector and
department-by-department performance framework for the civil service,
aligned to the **2026–2035 Productivity–Fiscal Compact**, with KPIs that
distinguish outputs from outcomes, efficiency from governance, and
ambition from auditable reality. It proposes clear accountability structures,
pragmatic measurement routines based on available data, and a phased
route to linking performance to institutional reviews and career
progression. The result is a decision-ready instrument for Cabinet and
senior leadership: fewer promises, sharper measures, and a system designed
to withstand both scrutiny and time.